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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the majority of the court of appeals' panel erred in its assessment 
of the district court's summary judgments. (Pet. Cert. 1.) 
Standard of review: On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals (rather than that of the trial court) 
for correctness. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^ [ 8, 152 
P.3d 312,313 (Utah 2007). The inquiry focuses on whether 
the court of appeals "correctly reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners Sunridge Development Corporation ("SDC") and Sunridge 
Enterprises, LLC ("SEL") filed suit against Defendant/Respondent RB&G Engineering, 
Inc. ("RB&G") on February 5, 2003, alleging negligence and breach of contract for 
RB&G's failure to identify geologic faults in a property development (despite evaluating 
the property on two separate occasions, first in 1993 and again in 1995). (R. at 1, 370, 
392-93.) Ignorant of RB&G's breaches, and relying on RB&G's reports, SDC/SEL 
designed the development over the faults. (R. at 10.) After construction began, 
SDC/SEL learned of RB&G's breaches when the Utah Geological Association conducted 
a survey and discovered the geologic faults. (R. at 384.) Based on the Association's 
conclusions, Provo City required SDC/SEL to build around the faults, which meant 
SDC/SEL could not construct and sell fourteen of the planned eighty-six units, which 
translated to a loss of over one million dollars for SDC/SEL. (R. at 3 84.) 
On March 8, 2005, RB&G filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial 
Summary Judgment ("First Summary Judgment"). (R. at 225.) Five months later, on 
August 2, 2005, the trial court granted RB&G's motion, holding that (1) SDC and SEL 
could not maintain their negligence claims, and (2) the economic loss rule, as well as lack 
of contractual privity between SEL and RB&G, precluded SEL from recovering for the 
inability to develop fourteen units as a result of RB&G's admitted failure to identify 
geologic faults in the development. (R. at 538.) (A copy of this ruling is attached hereto 
as Addendum 1.) This ruling effectively quashed all of SEL's claims and left SDC as 
the remaining plaintiff. SDC's only remaining damages were those associated with the 
2 
delay caused by RB&G's failure to identify the faults in the development (approximately 
$224,727) (r. at 395-98), but not the damages for the lost fourteen units themselves 
(approximately $1,057,983.41) (r. at 395). 
More than a year after the trial court's ruling on the First Summary Judgment, on 
July 18, 2006, RB&G filed another Motion for Summary Judgment ("Second Summary 
Judgment").1 (R. at 576). In the Second Summary Judgment, RB&G sought to dispose 
of what remained of SDC's and SEL's case. RB&G argued that in light of the trial 
court's favorable ruling on the First Summary Judgment, the only damages remaining 
were those stemming from SDC's breach of contract claims, which only included 
recovery for payroll, utilities, trenching/backfilling studies, office fees, and related 
expenses stemming from the delay after the faults were discovered (collectively referred 
to as "Administrative Damages"), all of which totaled approximately $224,727. (R. at 
579.) In opposition to the Second Summary Judgment, SDC/SEL submitted the affidavit 
of Stephen Stewart (the principal of both SDC and SEL) which outlined and verified the 
Administrative Damages that SDC incurred. (R. at 648-49.) In its reply memorandum, 
RB&G argued that Stewart's affidavit was untimely because it was submitted after the 
1
 The Utah Court of Appeals misunderstood the procedural posture of this case as 
indicated by the court confusing the dates of RB&G's two summary judgment motions, 
saying the trial court ruled on RB&G's motions for summary judgment "[i]n August and 
September of 2005 . . . ." Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2008 UT App 29, \ 
4, 177 P.3d 644, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). In fact, RB&G's two summary judgment 
motions were more than a year apart. 
More importantly, as discussed infra, the court of appeals confused the damages at 
issue in the First and Second Summary Judgments as well as the effect of the parties' 
agreement that SDC/SEL could appeal the First Summary Judgment, but not the Second 
Summary Judgment. Id. ^[ 4-6, 9-11. 
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dispositive motion deadline, and as a result, SDC had not introduced admissible prima 
facie evidence of its Administrative Damages of $224,727. (R. at 689-95.) The trial 
court agreed with RB&G and granted its Second Summary Judgment. (R. at 698.) (A 
copy of this ruling is attached hereto as Addendum 2.) 
Subsequently, the parties agreed to effectively end the case. On December 18, 
2006, they stipulated to dismiss the matter, subject to the following provisions: 
1. SDC and SEL could appeal the trial court's order on the First Summary 
Judgment (which precluded recovery for the lost fourteen units, which barred SDC's and 
SEL's negligence claims based on the economic loss rule, which found no privity 
between SEL and RB&G, and which limited SEL's damages to damages that SDC had 
incurred). (R. at 737.) 
2. SDC and SEL waived their rights to appeal the trial court's order on the 
Second Summary Judgment (which dealt only with SEC's recovery of its $224,727 in 
Administrative Damages, evidence of which the trial court excluded because SDC/SEL 
did not timely submit admissible prima facie evidence of damages). (R. at 737-38.) (A 
copy of the parties' Stipulated Motion to Dismiss is attached hereto as Addendum 3.) 
Thereafter, SDC and SEL filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. at 742.) On January 25, 
2008, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision, affirming the trial court's holding 
that "SDC did not present prima facie evidence of damages" (which, as part of the 
Second Summary Judgment, SDC/SEL agreed not to appeal and did not appeal pursuant 
to the December 18, 2006 stipulation). Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, 2008 UT 
App 29, Tf 1. Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned, both SDC and SEL's claims failed 
4 
in their entirety. Id. ^ 11. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1969, Stephen Stewart ("Stewart") formed Plaintiff/Petitioner Sunridge 
Development Corporation ("SDC"). (R. at 368, 392.) Stewart is a principal of SDC. (R. 
at 392.) 
Several years later, in 1981, SDC purchased an 87-acre parcel in the City of 
Provo, 10.2 acres of which would later become the Alpine Brook development 
("Property"), the property at issue in this case. (R. at 373.) 
SDC Commissions the First Geologic Report 
In 1993, prior to developing the Property, SDC contracted with RB&G to perform, 
among other things, a geologic study of the Property. (R. at 392-93.) On June 23, 1993, 
RB&G submitted its report (in the form of a two-page letter, excluding attached maps) to 
SDC ("1993 Report"), and RB&G invoiced SDC for the analysis. (R. at 370.) The 1993 
Report analyzed potential faults and other geologic features of the Property. (R. at 284.) 
It states, in part, that "the faults depicted on the map [attached to the Report] do not 
necessarily exist" and that "[t]here is a real possibility that these faults represent linear 
features which were misidentified by previous investigators." (R. at 285 (emphases 
added).) 
SDC Commissions Another Geologic Report 
Two years later, in 1995, SDC again commissioned RB&G, via oral contract, to 
conduct a geotechnical investigation of the Property. (R. at 370, 393.) SDC wanted 
RB&G to determine whether geological hazards existed throughout the Property and to 
5 
provide recommendations for foundation design. (R. at 393.) On August 4, 1995, 
RB&G provided SDC with its report ("1995 Report"). (R. at 291, 370.) The 1995 
Report provided, in part, that there were only small faults on the Property, but that such 
faults were expected for the area and that the faults would not pose development 
problems. (R. at 10.) SDC, relying on RB&G's two evaluations and recommendations, 
proceeded with developing the Property irrespective of the supposedly "misidentified," 
non-existent geologic faults. (R. at 10.) 
SDC Organizes its Sister Entity, Plaintiff/Petitioner Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, 
and SDC Conveys the Property to SEL 
In March 1996, Stewart formed Plaintiff/Petitioner Sunridge Enterprises, LLC 
("SEL"). (R. at 368-69.) Stewart is a principal of SEL, just as he is a principal of SDC. 
(R. at 392.) 
In 1996 SDC conveyed the Property to SEL for development. (R. at 393.) At the 
time of the conveyance, based on the 1993 and 1995 Reports, the Property would 
accommodate 86 units. (R. at 393.) 
In conjunction with SDC's conveyance of the Property to SEL, SDC also assigned 
and transferred all of its rights and claims regarding the various engineering reports, 
surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc., to SEL. (R. at 393.) 
SEL Continues to Develop the Property but Is Forced to Redesign the Property to 
Accommodate Newly Discovered Faults that RJB&G Missed 
Subsequently, SEL continued to develop the Property, including applying for the 
required permits from Provo City. (R. at 393-94.) Then, on October 27, 1998, Richard 
Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a letter discussing concerns 
6 
he had with the 1993 and 1995 Reports, including a recommendation that "further 
evaluation of surface fault rupture is necessary, and that slope-stability, debris-flow, 
flooding, and rock-fall hazards [must] be addressed." (R. at 394, 435.) The Utah 
Geological Association ("UGA") then recommended additional testing, which—when 
performed—uncovered faults that RB&G missed and said did not exist in its 1993 and 
1995 Reports. (R. at 384.) 
Based on the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other things, that 
certain fault set-backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.) 
Additionally, Provo City officials stopped the Property's development at various times 
from 1996 forward until SEL redesigned the Property to accommodate the faults. (R. at 
394-35.) 
This redesign and the set-back reduced the number of developable units by 
fourteen, amounting to a loss of $1,057,983.41. (R. at 395.) Had SDC or SEL known 
about the faults in 1993 or 1995, it would have designed the Property such that the fault 
areas could have been open space, such as parks, roads, or storm retention areas. (R. at 
395-96.) But by the time the mistake was discovered, the first phase of the development 
was almost complete, and the location of the road could not be moved. Id. 
SDC and SEL Suffer Additional Losses Based on 
Their Reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports 
Development of the Property suffered due to SDC and SEL's reliance on the 1993 
and 1995 Reports. (R. at 396.) For example, the state engineer had to conduct additional 
inspections, leading to delays. (R. at 396.) The whole development shut down during 
7 
these delays. (R. at 396.) 
Additionally, both SDC and SEL suffered additional losses because of their 
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 Only the first category of damages (the lost fourteen units) was at issue before 
the court of appeals and is at issue in this appeal. The remaining issues were resolved by 
stipulation of the parties on December 14, 2006. (R. at 738.) 
8 
Based on these damages, SDC and SEL brought suit on February 5, 2003. (R. at 
1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision because it based 
that decision on three key facts that the court misunderstood and that contradict the 
record. 
First and most importantly, the court misunderstood the distinctions between 
RB&G's first and second summary judgment motions and the trial court's rulings on 
both. RB&G's two summary judgments sought to dispose of two different categories of 
damages. The first summary judgment sought to prevent SDC and SEL from recovering 
over one million dollars for being unable to develop fourteen of the planned eighty-six 
units based on RB&G failing to identify geologic faults in the development. The second 
summary judgment sought to prevent SDC from recovering the balance of what it sough: 
Administrative Damages (payroll, redesign fees, etc.), which were the product of the 
delay that SDC/SEL suffered from having to redesign the development after the geologic 
faults were discovered. The trial court held that SDC failed to timely introduce evidence 
of its Administrative Damages, so it could not recover those sums. (And SDC/SEL 
agreed not to appeal the second summary judgment.) But the trial court never found that 
that SDC/SEL failed to timely present evidence of damage for the lost fourteen units. 
Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals held (and misunderstood). 
Second, the court misconstrued SDC/SEL's agreement not to appeal the trial 
court's decision granting RB&G's second summary judgment. And third, the court did 
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not recognize that Stephen Stewart, the principal of both SDC and SEL, filed an affidavit 
in April 2005 (before the dispositive motion deadline) detailing the damages to both SDC 
and SEL sufficient to overcome RB&G's motions for summary judgment. 
Having shown how the court of appeals misconstrued several facts from the 
record, SDC and SEL move to their substantive arguments why they should be able to 
recover for the lost fourteen units. 
First, SEL can recover the lost revenue from the lost fourteen units because SDC's 
assignment to SEL of all SDC's rights vis-a-vis the RB&G contracts, which puts SEL 
and RB&G in privity of contract. When an assignor assigns its interest in a contract, the 
assignor loses privity with the original obligor, but the assignee gains privity with the 
original obligor. This occurred in the instant case. 
Second, the SME Industries case does not preclude recovery of the fourteen units. 
RB&G and the trial court misunderstood the facts of that case and the fact that SME, the 
assignee on a contract, was limited to the assignor's damages (only $150,000) because 
the assignor had already incurred a maximum of $150,000 in damages. Thus, that was all 
SME could recover. 
Third, alternatively, if the Court finds no privity between SEL and RB&G, then 
SDC remains in privity of contract with RB&G, and SDC can recover consequential 
damages pursuant to RB&G's conceded breach. 
Fourth, even if the economic loss rule applies to SDC's negligence claim against 
RB&G, the Court should establish that professional engineers, like RB&G, have an 
independent duty to competently and thoroughly perform their duties. The Utah Supreme 
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Court left as an open question whether professionals like engineers are subject to this 
independent duty, and this case presents a ripe opportunity for the Court to prevent the 
erosion of tort liability by establishing an independent duty for professional engineers 
when they are not in privity of contract with the injured party. 
Professional engineers are in a position to foresee that negligence on their part will 
result in substantial economic and non-economic damages for their clients. Additionally, 
parties rely upon engineers' esoteric knowledge and expertise, and engineers know that. 
Finally, there is an information asymmetry between professional engineers and their 
clients such that their clients are forced to rely upon the engineers to accurately and 
thoroughly complete their tasks. Courts across the country are increasingly limiting the 
application of the economic loss rule since it effectively extinguishes tort claims. The 
poison pill that is the economic loss rule is admittedly valuable in some contexts, but the 
courts should limit its application. 
Last, if the Court declines to find for SDC and SEL on the other issues, the Court 
should exercise its broad equitable power and allow SDC and SEL to recover damages. 
Otherwise, RB&G's liability disappears, and it is liability proof in spite of its negligence 
and breaches. The Court should not allow RB&G to escape liability through this legal 
black hole. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS BASED ITS DECISION ON THREE KEY 
FACTS WHICH IT MISUNDERSTOOD AND WHICH CONTRADICT 
THE RECORD, 
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision because it based its 
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decision on three key facts that the court misunderstood and that contradict the record. 
First, the court misunderstood the distinctions between RB&G's first and second 
summary judgment motions and the trial court's rulings on both. Second (and likely 
based on the confusion of the two summary judgments), the court misconstrued 
SDC/SEL's agreement not to appeal the trial court's decision granting RB&G's second 
summary judgment. And third, the court did not recognize that Stephen Stewart, the 
principal of both SDC and SEL, filed an affidavit in April 2005 {before the dispositive 
motion deadline) detailing the damages to both SDC and SEL sufficient to overcome 
RB&G's summary judgments. 
A. The Court of Appeals Misunderstood the Damages at Issue in the First and 
Second Motions for Summary Judgment, Which Caused the Court to Err in 
Holding that Neither SDC nor SEL could Recover for the Lost 14 Units. 
The court of appeals misunderstood RB&G's two motions for summary judgment, 
the damages at issue in each motion, and the trial court's rulings on the motions. In sum, 
the court of appeals held that since SDC/SEL did not timely present evidence of one 
category of damages (which were at issue in the second summary judgment), SDC/SEL 
could not recover for the other category of damages (which were at issue in the first 
summary judgment). The court's conclusion cannot logically flow from the facts and 
procedural history of the case. 
This case involves two categories of damages. First, $1,057,983.41 in damages 
for SDC/SEL losing the ability to develop fourteen of the planned units due to RB&G 
failing to discovery geologic faults in the development. (R. at 395-96). And second, 
$224,727 in damages ("Administrative Damages") for delays and for redesigning the 
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development after Provo City prohibited SDC/SEL from building over the geologic faults 
that RB&G previously failed to identify. (R. at 396-98). 
RB&G's first summary judgment3 sought to prevent SDC/SEL from recovering 
the first category of damages (the lost fourteen units). (R. at 225-366.) RB&G argued 
that the economic loss rule and lack of privity between SEL and RB&G prohibited either 
SDC or SEL from recovering for the lost fourteen units. (R. at 235-41.) SDC/SEL filed 
an opposition, arguing the contrary position. (R. at 367-391.) Simultaneously, SDC/SEL 
filed an affidavit of Stephen Stewart4 (the principal of SDC and SEL) which outlined in 
detail the damages that SDC/SEL suffered, including damages for the lost fourteen units 
as well as SDC/SEL's Administrative Damages. (R. at 392-496.) 
But on August 2, 2005, the trial court granted RB&G's first summary judgment, 
holding that (1) SDC and SEL could not maintain their negligence claims, and (2) the 
economic loss rule, as well as lack of contractual privity between SEL and RB&G, 
precluded SEL from recovering for the inability to develop the fourteen units. (R. at 
538.) (Add, 1.) This ruling effectively terminated all of SEL's claims and left SDC as 
the remaining plaintiff. And SDC's only remaining damages were the Administrative 
Damages of approximately $224,727 (r. at 395-98), but not the damages for the lost 
fourteen units themselves (r. at 395). 
The history of RB&G's two motions for summary judgment, what each sought, 
and how the trial court ruled on each are more fully explained in the "Statement of the 
Case" on pages 3-5 supra. SDC/SEL incorporates that section by reference. 
4
 SDC/SEL filed this damages affidavit well before Stewart's August 28, 2006 
damages affidavit, which the trial court excluded because it was filed after the dispositive 
motion deadline (and which the court of appeals used to justify its decision affirming the 
trial court's grant of summary judgments). 
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RB&G then sought to dispose of SDC/SEL's remaining claim for Administrative 
Damages, so it filed its second summary judgment. (R. at 576-641.) In opposition, on 
August 28, 2006, SDC/SEL submitted another affidavit of Stephen Stewart which 
outlined and verified the Administrative Damages that SDC incurred. (R. at 648-49.) In 
its reply memorandum, RB&G argued that Stewart's affidavit was untimely because it 
was submitted after the dispositive motion deadline, and as a result, SDC had not 
introduced admissible prima facie evidence of its Administrative Damages of $224,727. 
(R. at 689-95.) On September 12, 2006,5 the trial court granted RB&G's second 
summary judgment, holding that Stewart's August 28, 2006 affidavit was untimely, and 
therefore, SDC had failed to timely present evidence of its Administrative Damages. (R. 
at 698.) (Add. 2.) Importantly, with this ruling, the trial court held only that SDC had 
failed to timely present evidence of its $224,727 in Administrative damages, not that 
SDC/SEL failed to timely present evidence of the $1,057,983.41 in damages from the lost 
fourteen units. 
This damages analysis is where the court of appeals erred in reaching its decision. 
When the trial court granted RB&G's second summary judgment, the court wiped out 
SDC's ability to recover its $224,727 in Administrative Damages because SDC allegedly 
failed to timely provide evidence of those damages. (Add. 2.) In contrast, the lost 
fourteen units were the subject of the first summary judgment, not the second summary 
5
 The court of appeals incorrectly recited that the trial court "ruled in favor of 
RB&G on two separate motions for summary judgment" in "August and September 2005 
. . . .") Sunridge, 2008 UT App 29, Tf 4, 177 P.3d at 645. The trial court actually ruled on 
RB&G's first motion on August 2, 2005 (r. at 538-42), and it ruled on the second motion 
more than a year later on September 12, 2006 (r. at 698-704). 
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judgment (which SDC/SEL agreed not to appeal, r. at 737-38), and the trial court made 
no finding or ruling that SDC or SEL failed to provide timely evidence of damages for 
the lost fourteen units, which the court of appeals seemed to bootstrap into the trial 
court's ruling on the second summary judgment. 
Judge Bench's persuasive dissenting opinion in the court of appeals captured this 
distinction and illuminated the analytical and factual flaws in the majority's opinion. 
SunridgeDev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2008 UT App 29,1ff[ 13-18, 177 P.3d at 647-
48. (A copy of the court of appeals' decision is attached hereto as Addendum 4.) First, 
Judge Bench succinctly and accurately recited the history of RB&G's two summary 
judgment motions, the outcome of each, and the correct issue on appeal. Id. f 13. "The 
issues before [the court of appeals were] focused on the summary judgment entered 
against SEL in September of 2005," not the summary judgment entered against SDC in 
October 2006. Id. 
Judge Bench then emphasized the crux of SDC/SEL's appeal and the flaw in the 
majority's opinion: "[t]he majority fails to analyze the central issue presented: whether 
SEL was in privity with RB&G for purposes of asserting a breach of contract claim." Id. 
If 14. Without so much as even tangentially addressing the privity issue, the majority 
uskip[ped] ahead and use[d] the trial court's later dismissal of SDC's breach of contract 
claim [in RB&G's Second Summary Judgment], on procedural grounds, as retroactive 
justification for thwarting SEL's appeal." Id. Privity was "a paramount consideration in 
this case," Judge Bench asserted. Id. ^ 15. The trial court was "wrong about SEL's 
privity with RB&G," so the case should not have proceeded as it did. Id. 
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Last, the majority utterly failed to address SEL's alternative argument, "that the 
economic loss rule should not bar its claim of negligence." Id. ^ 17. In spite of the 
majority's conclusion that SEL has no contractual claims to pursue, the majority "must 
[still] deal with SEL's alternative argument for negligence," which they did not do. Id. 
Therefore, the court of appeals erred when it held that neither SDC nor SEL could 
recover for the lost fourteen units based on the court's reasoning that SDC failed to 
provide prima facie evidence of its damages. The court conflated or misunderstood the 
operation and scope of the first and second summary judgments. SDC/SEL's alleged 
untimely submission of Stewart's August 28, 2006 affidavit as evidence of 
Administrative Damages in connection with RB&G's second summary judgment did not 
and does not affect SDC/SEL's ability to appeal or recover SDC/SEL's damages for the 
lost fourteen units which were at issue in the first summary judgment. 
B. The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Held that SDC and SEL Could Not 
Recover for the Lost 14 Units fat Issue in the First Summary Judgment) 
because SDC and SEL Stipulated Not to Appeal the Ruling Prohibiting 
Recovery of the Administrative Damages (as Issue in the Second Summary 
Judgment). 
Another point of confusion for the court of appeals was SDC/SEL's agreement not 
to appeal the second summary judgment. After the trial court granted RB&G's second 
summary judgment, the parties agreed to end the case by way of a Stipulated Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. at 737-38.) The stipulation provided the following. 
• SDC and SEL could appeal the trial court's order on the First Summary Judgment 
(which precluded recovery for the lost fourteen units, which barred SDC's and 
SEL's negligence claims based on the economic loss rule, which found no privity 
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between SEL and RB&G, and which limited SEL's damages to damages that SDC 
had incurred). (R. at 737.) 
• SDC and SEL waived their rights to appeal the trial court's order on the Second 
Summary Judgment (which dealt only with SEC's recovery of its $224,727 in 
Administrative Damages, evidence of which the trial court excluded because 
SDC/SEL did not timely submit admissible prima facie evidence of damages ). 
(R. at 737-38.) (Add. 3.) 
After conflating the damages at issue in the first and second summary judgments, 
the court of appeals then concluded that because SDC and SEL "agreed not to appeal the 
trial court's granting of the second motion for summary judgment, both SDC and SEL are 
precluded from claiming any damages against RB&G, whether sounding in contract or 
torts." Sunridge, 2008 UT App 29, Tf 11, 177 P.3d at 647 (emphases added). 
Clearly, based on its misunderstanding of the damages at issue in the first and 
second summary judgments, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that neither 
SDC nor SEL could recover for the lost fourteen units (at issue in the first summary 
judgment) because SDC and SEL agreed not to appeal the second summary judgment. 
This constitutes plain error that this Court should correct. 
C. The Court of Appeals Ignored Evidence of SDC/SEL's Damages in the 
Form of Stewart's April 8, 2005 Affidavit. 
Finally, the court of appeals failed to recognize—notwithstanding all the 
foregoing arguments—that on April 8, 2005, a year before the dispositive motion 
deadline, SDC/SEL filed an affidavit of Stephen Stewart (the principal of SDC and SEL). 
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(R. at 392-496). This affidavit, which specifically detailed SDC's and SEL's damages 
(including the lost fourteen units and SDC's Administrative Damages) was sufficient to 
overcome RG&G's two motions for summary judgment. Or at a minimum, it established 
the evidence necessary to overcome RB&G's second summary judgment motion, which 
the trial court granted and held that SDC/SEL had failed to timely introduce evidence of 
Administrative Damages. (R. at 698-704.) 
As Judge Bench pointed out in his dissent, the majority "ignore[d] evidence in the 
record that should have moved SEL's claim past summary judgment." Id. If 16. 
Stewart's April 2005 damages affidavit outlined "in specific dollar amounts" SDC's 
damages stemming from RB&G's failure to detect the faults on the Property. Id. This 
sworn statement was sufficient to crate a genuine issue of material fact, Judge Bench 
rightly argued. Id. Therefore, the trial court should not have granted RB&G's First 
Summary Judgment. Id. 
Stewart's "one sworn statement" was sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191,191 (Utah 1975). Therefore, the 
court of appeals should have reversed the trial court's grants of summary judgment. 
IL SEL CAN RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE LOST 14 UNITS BECAUSE 
THE ASSIGNMENT FROM SDC TO SEL CREATED PRIVITY 
BETWEEN SEL AND RB&G. 
Having argued that the court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the trial court, 
SDC/SEL now turn to the substance of their arguments. 
In 1996, when SDC sold the Property to SEL, SDC also assigned its universe of 
rights and claims regarding, among others, the various engineering reports, surveys, 
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studies, and zoning approvals. (R. at 393.) So SEL "stands in the shoes" of SDC with 
respect to all rights, duties, and obligations SDC held. By virtue of this assignment, there 
is privity between SEL and RB&G, and therefore, SEL can recover the loss for the 
fourteen units. 
A. An Assignment Creates Privity Between the Assignee and the Remaining 
Obligor on the Contract. 
Under Utah law, an assignment operates to create privity between the assignee and 
the original obligor on a contract. The Utah Supreme Court explicitly so held in Spears 
v. Warr, in which the defendants, the Warrs, sold certain real property to the Crittendens 
via warranty deed. 44 P.3d 742, 746 (Utah 2002) {overruled on other grounds by RHN 
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 2004)). The Warrs represented to the Crittendens 
that the sale included irrigation rights on the property, but after the sale, they refused to 
honor that representation, and unfortunately, the deed did not contain the agreement 
concerning irrigation. Id. at 746-47. Subsequently, the Crittendens sold the property to 
the Lewises, one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 747 n.5. In addition, the Crittendens also 
quitclaimed any and all water rights which the Lewises had in the property. Id. 
The plaintiffs, including the Lewises, sued the Warrs, and the trial court held for 
the plaintiffs, ordering the Warrs to convey irrigation rights to all the plaintiffs. Id. at 
747. The Warrs appealed several issues, the relevant issue for the instant case being 
whether "the Lewises lacked privity of contract to sue the Warrs." Id. at 754. 
The Warrs argued the quitclaim deed to the Lewises for the irrigation rights was 
not an assignment, and therefore, the Lewises had no contractual claim against the Warrs. 
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Id. The Lewises countered by arguing they "are successors to the Crittenden's claims 
because the Crittendens, by quitclaim deed, conveyed all of their interests in the irrigation 
water to the Lewises." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue and recognized that the 
quitclaim deed assigned not only all water rights in the property, but any and all 
contractual claims against the Warrs. Id. The court held, therefore, that "the Lewises 
[were] entitled to bring against the Warrs any contractual action the Crittenden's [sic] 
could have brought, including the instant claim for the irrigation water rights." Id. at 755 
(emphasis added). In other words, the assignment put the Warrs and the Lewises in 
privity of contract. 
B. Applying Spears to this Case, SEL Took All the Rights and Benefits SDC 
Held Under the Contracts with RB&G—Including the Right to Sue for 
Breach of Contract—and Nothing Less. 
As applied to the instant case, Spears resolves the issue of whether SEL is in 
privity with RB&G and whether SEL can recover damages for the lost revenue from the 
lost fourteen units. Clearly, in light of Spears, SEL is privity with RB&G as a result of 
SDC's assignment of "all of its rights and claims regarding the various engineering 
reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals . . .." (R. at 393.) And just as in Spears, 
SEL can bring any contractual action against RB&G that SDC could have brought, 
Spears, 44 P.3d at 755, because SEL stands in the shoes of SDC subsequent to the 
assignment. 
In other words, in a legal sense, an assignment is of no consequence to the original 
obligor on the contract; the original obligor's duties, rights, responsibilities, and liabilities 
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remain unchanged regardless of an assignment. Id. Were it otherwise, an assignor's 
assignment would vitiate the original obligor's duties, obligations, and liabilities under a 
contract, leaving the assignee without the bargained-for rights and benefits under the 
original terms of the contract. Thus, under RB&G's view of this issue, with each 
assignment, an assignee would not receive 100% of the rights and benefits under the 
assigned contract because the original obligor somehow would have shed some of its 
obligations and liabilities pursuant to the assignment. This understanding of contract 
assignment would not put the assignee in the shoes of the assignor, as intended, but 
would re-draft the contract with each assignment, chipping away at the assignee's rights 
each time. 
Since assignment language in the quitclaim deed put the Warrs and the Lewises in 
privity of contract, the Lewises could sue the Warrs for breach of contract. Similarly, 
since the assignment from SDC to SEL of all SDC's "rights and claims regarding the 
various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc." put SEL and 
RB&G in privity of contract, SEL can sue RB&G for breach of contract. 
Black's Law Dictionary also supports this position. Its defines "privity of 
contract" as "[t]he relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue 
each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Black's Law Dictionary 556 (2d 
pocketed. 2001). 
Therefore, since the assignment put SEL and RB&G in privity, any damages that 
were SDC's became SEL's. Additionally, any damages subsequent to the assignment 
remained with SEL. In either case, SEL could sue RB&G for breach of contract provided 
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SEL could satisfy the elements for breach of contract. 
C RB&G Breached its 1993 and 1995 Contracts with SDC (and by Virtue of 
the Assignment, with SEL). 
From the time of the 1996 Property sale and assignment of rights from SDC to 
SEL, SEL "owned" all of SDC's rights under SDCs various contracts with RB&G. In a 
legal sense, the assignment made no difference from RB&G's perspective. It rights, 
duties, obligations, and liabilities never changed. And once SEL discovered in 1998 that 
RB&G breached its contract by, inter alia, failing to identify the faults on the Property, a 
cause of action accrued. See, e.g., Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) 
("A cause of action accrues when the last event necessary to complete the legal claim 
occurs.'5). 
Specifically, SEL discovered the breach in 1998 (after the 1996 assignment) when 
Richard Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a letter detailing the 
discrepancies between RB&G's reports and the actual faults on the Property. (R. at 384.) 
The Utah Geological Association ("UGA") then recommended additional testing, which 
uncovered faults that RB&G missed in its 1993 and 1995 Reports. (R. at 384.) Based on 
the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other things, that certain fault set-
backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.) Those set-backs ultimately 
covered or infringed on the lost fourteen units. (R. at 384, 396.) 
D. RB&G's Breach Damaged SEL by Precluding SEL from Selling the Lost 
14 Units. 
As a result of the lost fourteen units, SEL lost the revenue those lots would have 
generated, which amounts to $1,057,983.41. (R. at 396.) This constitutes part of SEL's 
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and SDC's damages (since SEL, the Property's purchaser, was supposed to pay SDC for 
the units once they sold). (R. at 396.) 
Indeed, RB&G admitted its breach at the summary judgment hearing. RB&G, in 
arguing SEL could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, said "the 
difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breachedbefore the 
assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he reiterated: 
"so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they're] breached contract[s]." (R. at 744, p. 
52 (emphasis added).) 
Thus, all the elements of a breach of contract claim (a contract, performance by 
the party seeking recovery, breach by the other party, and damages, see, e.g., Eleopulos v. 
McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 145 P.3d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)) are met in this case. 
At the very minimum, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to SDC and SEL, there 
exist issues of material facts that necessitate reversing the trial court's grant of RB&G's 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
IIL THE SME INDUSTRIES CASE APPLIES, BUT THE TRIAL COURT AND 
RB&G MISINTERPRETED AND MISTAKENLY RELIED UPON IT, 
At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court and RB&G engaged in a lengthy 
dialogue about privity of contract and how SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001) applies to the instant case. (R. at 
744, pp. 39-63.) This colloquy lasted for quite some time, and the trial court patiently 
listened to RB&G's arguments that, based on SME, SEL and RB&G were not in privity 
of contract (in spite of the assignment), and that as a result, SEL could not sue RB&G for 
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breach of contract and thereby recover damages for the lost fourteen units. (R. at 744, pp. 
39-63.) 
After reading the hearing transcript, it is clear that RB&G's arguments 
contradicted the court's intuition and understanding of contract assignment, and the court 
repeatedly asked RB&G why the assignment failed to put SEL and RB&G in privity. (R. 
at 744, pp.41-63.) RB&G incorrectly told the court that "[tjhat's exactly what the Utah 
Supreme Court said in the SME case." (R. at 744, p. 41.) 
SME does not stand for the proposition that SEL is not in privity with RB&G, or 
that SEL cannot recover damages for breach of contract from RB&G, regardless of when 
the breach occurred. Rather, SME supports SEL's position that SEL "stands in the 
shoes" of SDC and can exercise SDC's universe of rights and benefits conferred upon it 
by virtue of the contracts with RB&G. 
A thorough review of the SME case is necessary before understanding how it 
instructs this case. 
A. SME Industries, 
In 1992, Salt Lake County ("SLCo.") entered into a contract for architectural 
services with Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc. ("TVSA") to renovate 
and expand the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City. SME Indus., 28 P.3d at 672. TVSA then 
subcontracted with two other firms, Gillies, Stransky, Brems & Smith ("GSBS") and 
Reaveley Engineers & Associates, Inc. ("Reaveley") (the three entities collectively 
known as "the design team") that would provide engineering services, but those entities 
did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity between SLCo. and 
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Two years later, in 1994, independent from the SLCo-TVSA contract, SLCo. 
contracted with Hughes-Hunt ("Hughes-Hunt") to act as the general contractor on the 
project. Id. Hughes-Hunt then separately contracted with SME Industries, Inc. ("SME") 
to furnish, fabricate, and erect the structural steel for the project. Id. Similar to GSBS 
and Reaveley, SME did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity 









Shortly after beginning work on the project, SME encountered problems with the 
structural portions of the plans as prepared by the design team. Id. These problems led 
to SME submitting numerous change orders. Id. As a result, SME incurred additional 
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costs of more than $2 million, which SME submitted to Hughes-Hunt for payment. Id. 
SME argued it was entitled to recover the costs because the design team was not timely in 
responding to change order requests, and the design team's specifications often conflicted 
with the plans for the project. Id. at 672-73. These problems delayed SME on this 
project and other, unrelated projects as well. Id. at 673. 
After receiving SME's invoice for $2 million, Hughes-Hunt forwarded it to 
SLCo., which asked the design team to review it. Id. The design team recommended that 
SLCo. reject the claim. Id. Nevertheless, SLCo. settled with Hughes-Hunt, paid Hughes-
Hunt $150,000, and assigned to Hughes-Hunt "all rights, causes of action, and claims 
[SLCo.] had against the design team related to the structural steel portion of the project." 
Id 
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Subsequently, Hughes-Hunt settled with SME, whereby Hughes-Hunt paid SME 
the $150,000 it received from SLCo. and "assign[ed] SME all of its direct and assigned 
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Thereafter, SME filed suit against the design team: TVSA, GSBS, and Reaveley. 
Id. The suit included the assigned claims that SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt had against the 
design team. Id. SME's two relevant causes of action were breach of contract and 
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B. SME's Breach of Contract Claim Against the Design Team. 
First, SME brought a breach of contract claim against the design team for a breach 
of the SLCo.-TVSA contract. Id. at 674. This Court recognized that SME was not a 
party to the SLCo.-TVSA contract and that SME was pursuing the claim pursuant to the 
assignment from SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt. Id. The trial court concluded that SME's 
breach of contract claim against the design team failed because an anti-assignment clause 
in the SLCo.-TVSA contract prohibited the assignment by SLCo. to Hughes-Hunt, and 
subsequently to SME, of a breach of contract cause of action against TVS A. Id. But this 
Court rever4sed, stating that the anti-assignment clause did not specifically address 
assignment of a cause of action seeking money damages for breach of contract after the 
contract had been fully performed. Id. at 676. 
The Court further stated in dicta that if the trial court determined the anti-
assignment clause did not prohibit SME from asserting a breach of contract claim against 
the design team based on the assignment, then SME's damages would be limited to those 
damages suffered by SLCo. Id. In other words, "SME may recover only what [SLCo.] 
could recover from TVS A per the assignment." Id. The Court then quoted the oft-
repeated maxim from American Jurisprudence that "the assignee is subject to any 
defenses that would have been good against the [assignor]; the assignee cannot recover 
more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a better position 
than the assignor." Id. 
C. SME's Damages Were Limited to $150,000 Because that is All SLCo. and 
Hughes-Hunt Could Have Recovered from the Design Team, Since SLCo. 
and Hughes-Hunt Both Settled for, and Suffered "Damages" of, $150,000. 
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It is this last principle from American Jurisprudence that RB&G pounced upon in 
the summary judgment hearing in arguing that SEL could not recover from RB&G for the 
lost fourteen units. But at the hearing, RB&G omitted one crucial fact: SME's damages 
were limited to those suffered by SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt (and the supreme court made 
note of it) because SLCo, and Hughes-Hunt had already settled and, in so doing, 
"suffered damages " to the tune of $150,000—no more, and no less. 
Thus, the key distinction between SME and the instant case is this: in SME, each 
assignor (SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt), in effect, capped the damages SME could recover 
from the design team by settling and incurring "damages" in the amount of $ 150,000. 
Put yet another way, SME could not recover more than $150,000 from the design team 
because $150,000 is the amount SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt could have recovered from the 
design team—nothing more. 
Therefore, SEL does not take issue with the general proposition that an assignee 
cannot recover more than the assignor could recover. But in the instant case, by virtue of 
the privity between SEL and RB&G, and by virtue of the fact that there is no artificial 
cap on SDC's damages, SEL can recover for the lost fourteen units. Any other 
conclusion would sequester RB&G's liability for its conceded breach of the 1993 and 
1995 contracts in a legal black hole, permitting no party to recover for the damages cause 
by the breaches. 
Moreover, SEL is not trying to recover more than SDC could have recovered. 
SEL is trying to recover the same damages SDC would have recovered but for the 
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assignment to SEL. RB&G should not be able to skirt liability for its breaches based on 
its contrived reading of the SME case and based on the assignment to SEL. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court misapplied the SME case, 
thereby precluding SEL from recovering for RB&G's admitted breaches of the 1993 and 
1995 contracts. Alternatively, at a minimum, there exist genuine issues of material facts 
whether SEL can recover for the lost fourteen units based on RB&G's breach. 
Regardless, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. 
IV. A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ACCRUES UPON THE BREACH, 
NOT UPON DAMAGE, THUS, SDC ASSIGNED A COMPLETED 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION TO SEL. 
A breach of contract cause of action accrues upon the breach, not at the time of 
damage. Therefore, SDC assigned a valid, completed breach of contract cause of action 
to SEL in 1996.6 Therefore, SEL can properly assert its breach of contract cause of 
action against RB&G for the lost fourteen units, which would have been SDC's damages. 
A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and 
(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). 
Generally, a cause of action "accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins 
to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 
6
 RB&G may argue, under Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 
1980), that an assignee's rights are limited when the assignor assigns only ua portion of 
its rights under the contract. . . ." But it is undisputed that in this case, SDC assigned 
all—not just a portion—of its rights under its contracts with RB&G to SEL. (R. at 393.) 
Indeed, subsequent to the assignment, SDC was no longer a party to the RB&G contract, 
and SDC wholly terminated its privity with RB&G. 
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Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P.3d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). But this is not 
the case with a cause of action for breach of contract: "a contract action ordinarily 
accrues at the time of breach." S & G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 
740 (Utah 1996); see also Clarke, 114 P.3d at 603 (holding that a breach of contract 
cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the 
breach). 
The breach of contract actions against RB&G accrued in 1993 and 1995 when 
RB&G failed to identify the existing faults on the development.7 Thus, at those 
moments, SDC could assert breach of contract actions against RB&G for damages, 
although the damages were yet undiscovered (hence the delay in asserting the claim and 
the reason for applying the "discovery rule," discussed infra). 
Therefore, when SDC transferred to SEL all of SDC's interest in the two contracts 
with RB&G, SEL could (as the assignee and successor-in-interest) assert the breach of 
contract actions against RB&G that SDC could have asserted. 
V. SINCE SDC/SEL DID NOT DISCOVER—AND COULD NOT HAVE 
REASONABLY DISCOVERED—RB&G'S BREACHES UNTIL YEARS 
LATER, THE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE "DISCOVERY RULE" TO 
TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
By RB&G's own admission, RB&G breached the contracts with SDC before the 
assignment. But SDC did not immediately bring suit upon discovery of the breaches 
7
 Importantly, RB&G admitted it breached the contracts with SDC. At the 
summary judgment hearing, in arguing that SEL could not assert a breach of contract 
claim against RB&G, its counsel said "the difference here, your Honor, is the contract 
was fully performed and breached before the assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p.52 
(emphasis added).) A moment later, he reiterated, "so when [the contracts were] 
assigned, [they're] breached contract[s]. " (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) 
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because it did not know about the breaches until 1998 when the Utah Geological Survey 
("UGS") notified the assignee, SEL, of existing faults under the property which 
necessitated a re-design and which results in the lost fourteen units. Further, neither SDC 
or SEL could have known about the faults until UGS notified them. In fact, SDC 
specifically contracted with and relied on RB&G to discover any faults and to avoid this 
kind of costly surprise. The Court should apply the "discovery rule" to toll the statute of 
limitations, making SDC/SEL's claims timely filed. 
As noted above, a cause of action generally accrues "'upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 
(Utah 2001) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)); see also Olsen 
v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) (stating that a limitations period "begins to 
run when the cause of action accrues"). This rule is different for contract actions, 
however, with accrual of the action upon the breach. S & G Inc., 913 P.2d at 740. 
Therefore, since the statute of limitations for suit upon a written contract is six years, 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 78B-2-309(2), the statute of limitations would have expired by the 
time SDC/SEL filed their claims in 2003. 
But as with most rules of law, "[t]here are a number of exceptions to this general 
rule [that a statute of limitations begins to run when the action accrues]." Myers, 635 P.2d 
at 86. One such exception is the "discovery rule," which "toll[s] the limitations period 
'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.5" Hill, 25 P.3d at 
1275 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). In other words, applying the discovery rule 
prevents the limitations period from beginning to run "until the facts forming the 
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foundation for the cause of action are discovered." Hill, 25 P.3d at 1275 (emphasis 
added); see also Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1348 ("Under the discovery rule, a statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of 
action."). 
There are two types of discovery rules: a "statutory discovery rule" and an 
"equitable discovery rule," Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), the 
latter of which applies in this case. The "equitable discovery rule" applies in two 
situations: 
(1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because 
of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and 
(2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of 
the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing 
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904, 910 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). 
This case justifies applying the second rationale of the equitable discovery rule. 
SDC hired RB&G to perform not one, but two, esoteric, technical, and scientific analyses 
of the development to determine whether there were geologic faults that would affect the 
design of and construction on the property. RB&G issued the reports, and SDC (and 
subsequently SEL) relied upon them. Indeed, SDC specifically procured geotechnical 
reports from RB&G to avoid any surprises once design and construction began. Yet in 
1998, three years after RB&G's final report, UGS notified SEL of the faults that existed 
on the property and that SEL had to complete a re-design to compensate for the existing 
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faults. This re-design resulted in the lost fourteen units and a loss of more than a million 
dollars for SDC/SEL. 
If the Court refuses to apply the equitable discovery rule in this case, it would 
work an injustice on SDC and SEL. They had no reason to know of, and had no ability to 
discover, RB&G's breaches and the damages therefrom until UGS notified SEL in 1998 
of the faults that RB&G had missed. Indeed, SDC contracted with RB&G precisely to 
avoid this kind of costly surprise. 
The lost fourteen units are a "latent injury," as discussed in Christiansen v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., where this Court applied the discovery rule to toll a statute of limitations 
period when the plaintiff did not know or have reason to know "of the existence and 
cause of the injury which is the basis of his action." 136 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Utah 2006). 
Just as in Christiansen, SDC and SEL did not know, and had no reason to know, of the 
existence of the cause of injury (or the injury itself) until 1998. Thus, the Court should 
apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this case. 
Moreover, in Myers, the Utah Supreme Court applied the discovery rule to toll a 
statute of limitations because "the plaintiffs were unaware of the facts giving rise to their 
cause of action." Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Similarly, in this case, neither SDC nor SEL 
was aware of RB&G's breaches until UGS informed SEL in 1998 of the faults on the 
property that RB&G missed, which resulted in the lost fourteen units. Everything to 
satisfy a cause of action had occurred—it was just a question of when SDC/SEL 
discovered it. Or, as this Court stated in Myers, the Court should apply the discovery rule 
and toll the statute of limitations because "[SDC/SEL] were unaware of the facts giving 
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rise to their cause of action." Therefore, the statute of limitations should not have begun 
until SEL learned of RB&G's breaches in 1998 from UGS. 
The Olsen case clearly establishes that "a statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of action." 865 P.2d at 1348. Since 
neither SDC nor SEL learned of (or could have learned of) RB&G's breaches until UGS 
notified SEL in 1998 of the existing faults, the statute of limitations did not begin to run 
until then. Thus, SEL's breach of contract claim was timely filed. 
VL IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT FINDS NO PRIVITY 
BETWEEN SEL AND RB&G, THEN SDC REMAINS IN PRIVITY WITH 
RB&G, AND SDC CAN RECOVER ITS DAMAGES AS A 
CONSEQUENCE OF RB&G'S BREACHES. 
In the event the Court finds that SEL and RB&G are not in privity of contract, 
then by logical conclusion, SDC remains in privity of contract with RB&G. And as a 
result, SDC would be entitled to consequential damages flowing from RB&G's breaches 
of the 1993 and 1995 contracts. 
In any event, whether SDC is in privity of contract, and thereby entitled to 
consequential damages pursuant to RB&G's breaches, is a disputed genuine issue of 
material fact necessitating reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. 
VII. EVEN IF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO SDC'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, RB&G HAS AN INDEPENDENT DUTY, AS A 
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING FIRM, TO PERFORM 
COMPETENTLY AND THOROUGHLY, THUS EXCEPTING SDC'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FROM THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE. 
Even if the Court affirms the trial court's application of the economic loss rule to 
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SDC's negligence claim against RB&G, SDC should nonetheless be able to maintain its 
negligence claim against RB&G. Since RB&G is a professional engineering firm, it has 
an independent duty to perform competently, professional, and thoroughly, knowing 
others will rely, to their detriment, upon its analyses and conclusions. If those analyses 
and conclusions are incorrect due to the engineer's negligence, the party relying thereon 
will suffer dire economic and non-economic harm—just as SDC and SEL did in this case. 
RB&G could foresee economic harm to SEC (in terms of delays, demolition, re-
construction, and re-design) if RB&G negligently performed its geologic studies. This 
foreseeabihty is the very essence of tort liability, and it pushes RB&G's liability into tort 
doctrines and outside of the economic loss rule. 
A. SDC Lost its Privity of Contract with RB&G when SDC Assigned its 
Rights Under the 1993 and 1995 Contracts to SEL in 1996. 
Initially, SDC contracted with RB&G for RB&G to perform geologic analyses of 
the Property. (R. at 392-93.) But when SDC assigned its rights under those contracts to 
SEL in 1996, SDC lost its privity of contract with RB&G; SEL gained it. (R. at 393.) It 
cannot be disputed that SDC relinquished all its rights under the 1993 and 1995 contracts 
to SEL (r. at 393), thus endowing SEL with those rights. 
As a result, SDC was left as a third party, with no privity of contract with RB&G. 
This is a crucial point because SDC now moves this Court to find an independent tort 
duty for professional engineers that exempts them from the economic loss rule to the 
extent they are not in privity of contract with the injured party. Thus, SDC appeals the 
dismissal of its negligence claim against RB&G. Conversely, since SEL is in privity of 
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contract with RB&G, SEL does not appeal the dismissal of its negligence claims against 
RB&G, as SEL and RB&G were in a position to allocate risk and damages by contract 
(by virtue of the assignment). 
R The Economic Loss Rule Prevents a Recovery of Economic Damages 
Based on a Theory of Unintentional Tort, but when an Independent Duty 
Applies to the Tortfeasor, the Economic Loss Rule Does Not Preclude 
Recovery of Economic Damages. 
It is well-settled that the economic loss rule "prevents a party from claiming 
economic damages in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury." 
West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 139 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation and 
quotations omitted). 
But equally prominent is the principle that where an "independent duty exists, the 
economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim because the claim is based on a recognized 
independent duty of case and thus does not fall within the scope of the rule." Id. at 1062 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
C. It Is an Open Question Whether Other Professionals Owe Their Clients an 
Independent Tort Duty. 
In SME, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the economic loss rule to bar a 
contractor's or subcontractor's negligence claim against a design professional, the court 
left the door open to find an independent tort duty vis-a-vis other professionals: "the issue 
of whether the economic loss rule bars claims against other professionals, such as lawyers 
and accountants, is not before us, and we do not decide it." SME Indus., 28 P.3d at 682 
n.9. 
Indeed, the supreme court's application of the economic loss rule in SME was 
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logical and consistent with the rational behind the economic loss rule. See, e.g., West, 
139 P.3d at 1062 (reasoning that Utah courts generally apply the economic loss rule 
where parties can avoid their economic loss "with contracts and are thus free to adjust 
their respective obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations. . . . [RJelief for defeated 
economic expectations . . . was to come from the contract itself.. ." (citations and 
quotations omitted)). A building contractor and an architect are construction-savvy 
entities, and they would scarcely (if ever) work together on a development sans contract. 
Therefore, since a contractor and an architect can and do bargain for their rights and 
remedies, and would scarcely perform otherwise, the supreme court appropriately applied 
the economic loss rule to bar negligence claims by a contractor against a design 
professional. 
In the instant case, however, SDC relied upon RB&G to accurately and 
competently perform its analyses, the failure of which led to enormous financial loss for 
SDC Since SDC lost its privity with RB&G pursuant to the 1996 assignment, SDC 
should now be able to assert its negligence claim against RB&G based on RB&G's 
esoteric knowledge and experience, the information asymmetry between SDCand RB&G, 
and SDC's reliance upon RB&G for a professional, complete, accurate analysis of the 
Property. 
D. This Court Can Properly Address Common Law Issues and Make Policy 
Judgments "To Get the Law Right/' As Evidenced By the Utah Supreme 
Court in Yazd v. Woodside Homes. 
Admittedly, "courts [typically] cede authority over matters of policy to the 
political branches of the government." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283, 
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287 (Utah 2006). But when policy considerations "bear on a subject lodged firmly within 
the court's sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make 
policy judgments necessary to get the law right." Id. 
The question whether professional engineers owe an independent tort duty to their 
clients is squarely within this Court's sphere, precisely as whether builder-contractors 
owed an independent duty to their customers was within the supreme court's sphere in 
Yazd. Thus, this Court can appropriately and timely speak to this issue. 
E. Professional Engineers have an Independent Duty Based on a "Special 
Relationship" with their Clients Stemming from Information Asymmetry, 
Engineers' Esoteric Knowledge and Expertise, and their Clients' Reliance 
Thereon. 
Legal duty is a product "of policy judgments applied to relationships." Yazd, 143 
P.3d at 286; see also Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005) ("Duty 
arises out of the relationship between the parties and imposes a legal obligation on one 
party for the benefit of the other party."). Whether one party owes another party a legal 
duty is a function of "[a]ge, knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and 
cognitive ability," among other factors. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 286. When there is a disparity 
in "one or more of these circumstances," the balance in the parties' relationship becomes 
distorted "to the degree that one party is exposed to unreasonable risk," justifying "the 
law['s] intervene[tion] by creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a 
manner that does not reward exploitation of its advantage" Id. (emphasis added). 
But simply because one party possesses "important, even vital" information does 
not mean that party has a legal duty to another absent some relationship between the 
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parties. Id. at 287. An example of this is the "special relationship" doctrine in tort law. 
Id. "A person has no legal duty to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger 
unless the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a 'special relationship' 
with either the stranger or the potential victim." Id:, see also Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 
P.2d 305, 310 (Utah 2000) ("a person has no affirmative duty . . . to protect another from 
harm" unless the person "upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed" has a special 
relationship with either the person causing the harm or the injured person). Thus, in the 
context of ordinary negligence actions, "a special relationship is what is required to give 
rise to a duty to act. .. ." Webb, 125 P.3d at 910. 
The essence of a "special relationship" is "dependence by one party upon the other 
. . . . " Webb, 125 P.3d at 909. The Utah Supreme Court, quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary, also noted that a "special relationship" is "[a] nonfiduciary relationship 
having an element of trust, arising especially] when one person trusts another to exercise 
a reasonable degree of care . . . ." Webb, 125 P.3d at 909-10 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 1405 (7th ed. 1999) (first alteration in original)). 
Utah courts have found that typically, although not always, parties subject to a 
"special relationship" do not allocate their risk with contracts. West, 139 P.3d at 1064. 
In one particular case, the Utah Supreme Court found a "special relationship" between an 
accountant and a third party despite the lack of contractual privity, thereby subjecting the 
accountant to economic damage in spite of the economic loss rule. Milliner v. Elmer Fox 
& Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The supreme court went on to hold that a third party 
could maintain a negligence action against an accountant where the third party relied on 
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the accountant's report and where the accountant knew that the party would rely on the 
report for a particular purpose. Id. at 808. Speaking to privity between the parties, the 
court clarified that "lack of privity is not a defense where an accountant... is aware of 
the fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties . . . ." Id. 
Milliner is particularly instructive in the instant case because the accountant knew 
the party would rely upon his report, just as in our case, RB&G knew SDC and/or SEL 
would rely upon RB&G's two reports. And privity or not (although SDC. does not ask 
this Court to permit tort recovery when an engineer is in privity with the injured party), 
the Utah Supreme Court suggests that where a professional knows that a party—even a 
third party, in Milliner's case—will rely upon the professional's report for a particular 
purpose, that party can assert a negligence claim against the professional because a 
"special relationship" exists. 
Utah courts have found a "special relationship" between other parties as well. For 
example, as mentioned above, there is a "special relationship" between builder-
developers and their customers, even though those parties typically allocate their risk by 
contract. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 287. Additionally, Utah courts found a "special relationship" 
between surveyor and third parties, despite lack of privity of contract. Price-Orem 
Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986).8 
And in Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court found a special relationship 
8
 Coincidentally, RB&G was a defendant in the Price-Orem case as well (there 
styled as "Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc."), wherein RB&G also argued that based on a 
lack of contractual privity, it could not be liable for its negligence. Especially in light of 
that case, RB&G should be well aware of its duties and obligations to those who rely 
upon its analyses and reports. 
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between real estate brokers and their clients. 48 P.3d 235, 241 (Utah 2002). In finding 
the "special relationship" in Hermansen, the court reasoned that a real estate agent owes a 
duty, independent of any express or implied contract, "to be honest, ethical, and 
competent" in his or her relationship with the client. Id. Real estate professionals cannot, 
the court held, breach their duty to be competent, and not be liable for their actions. Id. 
Similarly, engineering professionals occupy a comparable status in their industry. 
Companies and individuals wholly rely upon engineering professionals to provide 
accurate, complete, competent advice and reports. To the extent engineering 
professionals fail that standard, they must be held accountable for the consequences. 
There is a real possibility that an engineering professional, like RB&G, could negligently 
performs its duty by, for example, failing to identify faults, leading to considerable 
damage in the form of substantial economic and non-economic losses. Yet the 
engineering professional would be liability-proof; the damaged party could not recover 
any money damages in spite of the engineer's negligence and breach. The instant case is 
evidence of this very scenario. 
One unique feature of professional engineers that gives rise to an independent 
duty—especially prominent in the instant case—is the foreseeability they have with 
respect to damages should they negligently perform their duties. In other words, 
engineers can foresee that their clients will suffer Herculean financial harm if the 
engineers' tests, analyses, and reports are flawed due to negligence on the engineers' part. 
As engineers are often involved at the beginning of a development, as RB&G was here, 
the engineers know their clients rely upon them for professional, competent advice with 
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respect to development design and construction. If the engineers are negligent, they 
know their clients will suffer the financial consequences. 
Therefore, professional engineers owe their clients an independent duty to perform 
competently, thoroughly, and professionally. Anything less and engineers can escape 
liability, as RB&G has nearly done in this case. 
F. The Economic Loss Rule, While Valuable, Is Limited in its Application, 
Lest the Rule Swallow Tort Law Entirely. 
As Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently noted, the economic 
loss rule is "'the ever-expanding, all-consuming alien life form portrayed in the 1958 B-
movie classic The Blob"' and is '"a swelling globule on the legal landscape . . . . ' " 1325 
N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 841 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005)). 
Although useful in limited contexts, this Court should take appropriate steps to limit its 
application so as to prevent the rule from swallowing legitimate causes of action and 
recovery in tort. 
The Florida Supreme Court sagely addressed the limited applicability and use of 
the economic loss rule, as it is a potent doctrine that effectively bars otherwise valid 
causes of action. 
In Moransais v. Heathman, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that although 
"the economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited value in . . . damages law, 
we never intended to bar well-established common law causes of action, such as those for 
neglect in providing professional services'' 1AA So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis 
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added). Rather, as the court noted, the rule was originally intended to limit causes of 
action in the product liability context, thus, the rule's application "should generally be 
limited to those contexts or situations where the policy considerations are substantially 
identical to those underlying the product liability-type analysis," id., such as the builder-
developer exception the Utah Supreme Court adopted in Yazd. 
Speaking more directly to negligence causes of action against "professionals," the 
court went on to clarify that since such actions "often involve purely economic loss 
without any accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending the economic 
loss rule to these cases would effectively extinguish such causes of action." Id.; see also 
Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial 
Torts, Fla. B J. 34, 40 (Nov. 1995) ("[I]f the doctrine were genuinely applied to bar all 
tort claims for economic losses without accompanying personal injury or property 
damage, the rule would wreak havoc on the common law of torts."); Blanche M. 
Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 741, 742 
(1990) ("Because attorney malpractice rarely results in personal injury or property 
damage, the damages plaintiffs seek most often in malpractice claims against attorneys 
are for economic or pecuniary losses allegedly caused by the attorney's failure to exercise 
adequate care."). Surely this cannot be what Utah courts have in mind for the economic 
loss rule in Utah. 
The Florida Supreme Court has the right analysis. Since professionals' negligence 
often results only in economic loss without accompanying personal injury or property 
damage, extending the economic loss rule to negligence actions against professional 
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engineers would extinguish recovery for professional engineers' negligence. This Court 
should refuse to allow professional engineers that engage in negligence from answering 
for their negligence. 
G. Other Jurisdictions Have Recognized the Limits of the Economic Loss Rule 
By Applying the "Special Relationship" Exception to Professional 
Engineers like RB&G, as Well as Other Professionals. 
Nineteen other jurisdictions have persuasively exempted professionals— 
commonly engineers, architects, and design professionals—from the protection of the 
economic loss rule based on the professionals' foreseeability of the damages and on the 
injured party's reliance on the professional's expertise and knowledge, about which the 
professional is aware. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, 
and Washington.9 
9
 See, e.g., Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (contractor may 
recover against architect); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc, 
Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (subcontractor may recover against 
engineer); Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., All F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash. 
1976) (subcontractor may recover against architect); United States ex rel Los Angeles 
Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (contractor 
may recover against architect); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) 
(contractor may recover against architect or engineer); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. 
Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984) (subcontractor may recover against 
architect); Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984) 
(architect liable on negligence theory to contractor for increased cost of construction due 
to error in plans and specifications); Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M & P Equip. Co., 661 
S.W.2d 345 (Ark. 1983) (contractor may recover against engineer); Wolther v. 
Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (purchaser of home may recover 
against engineer); Guardian Const, v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del. 
Super. 1990) (lack of contractual privity between design engineer and general contractor 
45 
In fact, since the 1990s, courts are increasingly limiting the application of the 
economic loss rule against professionals, frequently engineers, for professional 
negligence. For example: 
• In Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co. v. Duke Levy & Assoc, LLC, 475 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 
2007), the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, held that an engineer could be 
held liable in negligence in spite of a governing contract between the parties. The 
court declined to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (D. N.M. 
2006), the U.S. District Court in New Mexico held that the economic loss rule 
does not bar tort claims arising from an independent duty of care, specifically, a 
was not fatal to negligence and negligence misrepresentation claims against design 
engineer, notwithstanding fact that contractor and subcontractor were seeking purely 
economic damages); Normoyle-Berg & Assoc, Inc. v. Village of Deer Creek, 350 N.E.2d 
559 (111. Ct. App. 1976) (contractor may recover against engineer); Gurtler, Hebert & 
Co., Inc. v. WeylandMachine Shop, Inc., 405 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981) 
(subcontractor may assert third-party claim against architect); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks 
Co., 222 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1967) (contractor may recover against engineer); Natl Sand, 
Inc. v. Nagel Constr., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. 1990) (subcontractor may maintain 
action against engineers); Bacco Const. Co. v. American Colloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (contractor may recover against engineer); Magnolia Constr. Co. 
v. Mississippi Gulf South Eng'rs, Inc., 518 S. 2d 1194 (Miss. 1988) (architect owes duty 
to contractor); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C Morris Assoc, 418 A.2d 1290 (N.J. 
Super. 1980), affd, 489 A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. 1985) (contractor may recover against 
design professional); Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 
539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989) (owner may recover against consulting engineer); Shoffner 
Indust, Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Const. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (contractor 
may recover against architect); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover County, 255 
S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct App. 1979) (architect, in absence of privity of contract, may be sued 
by general contractor or subcontractor for economic loss foreseeably resulting from 
architect's breach of duty of due care in performance of contract with owner); Forte 
Bros, Inc. v. Natl Amusement, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987) (contractor may recover 
against architect); Associated Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lubbock Glass & Mirror Co., 
Ml S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (subcontractor may recover against architect). 
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negligence claim for professional negligence. That court relied in part upon the 
Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hermansen, that where an independent duty 
exists, the economic loss rule does not fall within the scope of the rule. Id. at 
1174. 
• In Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 591 (W. Va. 2000), the Supreme Court of 
West Virginia, although applying the economic loss rule, went on to state that a 
tortfeasor may be held liable "where a special and narrowly defined relationship 
can be established between the tortfeasor and the plaintiff who was deprived of an 
economic benefit.. ." (emphasis added). Such cases would involve the 
tortfeasor's foreseeability that economic losses would result from the tortfeasor's 
negligence. Id. 
• In Moransais v. Heathman, 1AA So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court 
held that a party could maintain a negligence claim against engineers who failed to 
detect and disclose certain defects in the property. The court declined to apply the 
economic loss rule. 
• In Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 
463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a 
contractor could maintain suit in tort for purely economic losses because the 
engineer owed the contractor a duty not to negligently design or negligently 
supervise the project. The court declined to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In John Martin Co., Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a subcontractor, despite lack of privity, could 
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make a claim against the construction manager based upon negligence. The court 
declined to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Engrs, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2006), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the economic loss rule did not 
bar an injured party from recovering economic damages from an engineering firm 
for negligence. 
• In Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., No. X06CV000169755S, 
2003 WL 22962147, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003) {off d by Best Friends 
Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., 823 A.2d 329 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)), the 
Superior Court of Connecticut held that the economic loss rule did not bar a 
negligence claim against an engineering firm. (A copy of this decision is attached 
hereto as Addendum 5.) 
• In Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Eng 'rs, No CA 01 -0154A, 2003 WL 
22670881, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct 22, 2003), the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts held that a negligence claim against an engineer was viable because 
the engineer "knew [the injured party] would be relying on [the engineer's 
knowledge and expertise in staking property]." The court declined to apply the 
economic loss rule. (A copy of this decision is attached hereto as Addendum 6.) 
As the Court can see, jurisdictions around the country are increasingly limiting the 
application of the economic loss rule to professionals, especially engineers, because 
plaintiffs so wholly rely upon engineers' expertise and knowledge in planning and 
developing property, whether a single home or an enormous planned community. 
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Engineers' knowledge, expertise, and information asymmetry give rise to this 
independent duty. Utah should follow its sister jurisdictions and adopt this duty. 
"A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is can expression of the sum 
total of those consideration of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is 
not] entitled to protection.'" Webb, 125 P.3d at 909 (quoting Univ. of Denver v. 
Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987)). This Court should protect individuals and 
entities from negligence by professional engineers. 
The Court should find professional engineers have an independent duty to their 
clients to perform with the skill, precision, and knowledge their clients expect and the law 
demands. 
VIII. EQUITY DEMANDS THAT RB&G BE HELD LIABLE FOR ITS 
CONCEDED BREACHES OF THE 1993 AND 1995 CONTRACTS. 
Based on principles of equity, the Court should not allow RB&G to escape 
liability for its negligence and admitted breaches. It must be liable for the consequences 
of its actions. 
Utah courts, "in light of [their] plenary powers in administering law and equity, 
can make such orders as are necessary and expedient in order to do justice between the 
parties as the particular circumstances warrant." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1973). 
In most cases before this Court, "fairness" and "equity" are loose concepts, 
ambiguous because they rarely apply to dispositively affect the disposition of a case. But 
occasionally, a case comes along where the principles of equity are truly, undeniably 
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stacked in one party's favor. This is such a case. 
If the Court (1) does not find SEL in privity with RB&G, and (2) applies the 
economic loss rule to preclude SDC's negligence claim, and (3) fails to adopt an 
independent duty for professional engineers, RB&G is liability proof. No party can 
recover for RB&G's conceded breached which caused more than $1 million in damages. 
SDC and SEL must absorb that entire liability. This contravenes all the principles of the 
law and equity. 
The three goals of tort law are deterrence, retribution, and compensation. 
Permitting RB&G to escape liability for its breaches contravenes all three goals. It does 
not deter others from being negligent; it does not punish RB&G for its negligence; it does 
not reimburse or compensate SDC and SEL for their losses. 
Based on the Court's inherent, broad powers of equity and fairness, the Court 
should preclude RB&G from escaping liability by allowing SDC to recover under its 
negligence claim and by allowing SEL to assert its breach of contract claim to recover for 
the lost fourteen units. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant 
of partial summary judgment in RB&G's favor and remand this case back to the trial 
court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of June 2008. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
JM 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of June 2008, two true and correct copies of 
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MR. CRAIG C. COBURN 
MR. LINCOLN HARRIS 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
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RB&G ENGINEERING, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendant. 
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case # 030400328 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the 
following: 
Ruling 
Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the Court on March 9, 
2005, asserting that SDC's and SEL's negligence claims are barred as a matter of law by Utah's 
economic loss rule. Defendant contends that only SDC's claim for breach of contract remains. 
Plaintiffs assert that most of its damages are recoverable or that the amount of damages are at 
least in dispute and that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National 
American Life Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated 
that summary judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect 
the prompt administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where 
no triable issue of fact is disclosed." Id. at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary 
judgment is to "provide a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can 
be resolved as a matter of law, thereby conserving both party and court resources. Rich v. 
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68 (Utah 1976). 
The Court first finds that there are no material issues of fact and that the issues before 
the Court can be resolved as a matter of law. 
The Court is unpersuaded that SDC and SEL can maintain their independent negligence 
claims. The Court notes that "the economic loss rule holds that 'economic losses are not 
recoverable in negligence absent physical damage or bodily injury.'" SME Industries, Inc V. 
Thompson, Ventuleet, Stainback and Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54, \ 35, 28 P.3d 669. The 
Court, therefore, for the reasons stated in Defendant's memoranda, finds that SDC's and SEL's 
negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule. 
The next issue before the Court is whether the economic loss rule limits Plaintiffs' 
damages. Defendant asserts that SME Industries is controlling and directly on point in this 
matter and that SEL must stand in the shoes of SDC and can only recover damages that SDC is 
entitled to. Plaintiffs asserts that SEL is in privity with Defendant and that SEL may seek its own 
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damages from Defendant. Seemingly, under general theories of contract law, one might suggest 
that SEL may recover its damages which were incurred due to Defendant's breach of contract 
with SDC. However, the Court notes SME Industries, which was determined in hindsight and is 
controlling, stands for the rule that an assignee stands in the shoes of an assignor and that the 
assignee never stands in a better position than the assignor. SME Industries, 28 P.3d at 676. 
Under SME Industries, SEL may only pursue SDC's claims and remedies against Defendant. 
In this case, SDC and SEL have characterized their damages respectively. Under SME 
Industries, SEL's damages are limited by that characterization. Accordingly, SEL only has a 
claim for damages incurred by SDC1, 
In summary, the Court grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 
Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. 
1The Court notes that SEL's damages do not appear to be 
consequential damages. The facts do not illustrate that SEL 
bought the property at an increased price based on unit value. 
There was no showing that SEL suffered any loss of actual value 
regarding the entire property due to the loss of the 14 units as 
a result of Defendant's alleged breach. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
generalized the development process and have not distinguished 
when Plaintiffs were on notice of Defendant's breach. As a 
consequence, many of Plaintiffs' alleged damages are not 
consequential damages. 
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Dated this y y ^ d a y of August, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Craig C. Coburn 
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RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMUDGE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, e t aL , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RB&G ENGINEERING, INC. 
Defendant. 
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case # 030400328 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following: 
Ruling 
Defendant filed its most recent Motion for Summary Judgment with the Court on July 26, 
2006 alleging that the Plaintiff has failed to establish & prima facie case relative to its breach of 
contract claims. Specifically, the Defendant claims the Plaintiff failed to produce evidence (beyond 
a generalized summary produced for this litigation) of the some $388,820.21 it claims in damages, 
save for the claim relative to the trenching and backfill studies in the amount of $22,207.50 . 
Plaintiff argues that it has produced additional evidence beyond the generalized summary 
to substantiate its damage claims. The Plaintiff acknowledges that this evidence is only now 
forthcoming in the form of affidavits, but argues that admission of the evidence does not prejudice 
the Defendant, and is appropriate in the interest of justice and fairness. The Defendant has countered 
that admissi on of this new evidence is not timely, and should have been provided prior to the August 
1, 2006 deadline to file any dispositive motion. 
The Court notes that this case was initially filed by the Plaintiff on January 23,2003. The 
Court also notes that once a case enters the discovery process both parties have an obligation under 
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(1) to make evidentiary disclosures to one another. That is an obligation 
imposed by Rule 26, it is not an obligation that arises once the opposing party requests certain 
information, nor does it arise in connection with a court's scheduling order, or an order compelling 
discovery (though all these things may take place during the discovery process). It is an affirmative 
obligation on the part of attorneys to share relevant information at the initial stages of litigation. The 
rule is designed to streamline the litigation process and, at an early stage, bring to light all relevant 
information that will form the foundation of the parties' legal theories, frame the issues for trial, or, 
potentially, lead to a less costly settlement. 
The Plaintiff requests that this Court, in essence, place the substance of the case above 
procedure, ignore Plaintiffs failure to produce its evidence timely, and proceed to trial. The Court 
notes, however, that what the Plaintiff casts as "procedure" is really the Defendant's substantive right 
to rely upon the record after the close of discovery and move for summary judgment to avoid the 
time and expense of trial on a claim not supported by the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recently held that reliance upon the rules is more than a mere formality stating: "the rules provide 
the source of available relief. They are designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure 
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which the parties and the courts can follow and rely upon." State v. Ison, 135 P.3d 861, 863 (Utah 
2006), quoting Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966) (internal citations omitted). 
There may have been a day when parties could withhold information from one another 
under the notion that the other side had not requested it, but, under the current rules an attorney has 
an affirmative obligation to disclose, and to disclose timely. Rule 26 is an important part of Utah's 
civil pre-trial process, and is designed to bring a transparency to litigation that serves the interests 
of fairness and justice. It seems implausible to this Court that both the letter, and the spirit, of the 
rule has been observed by a Plaintiff which files suit in 2003, and then, nearly four years later offers 
what may be germane evidence only in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court notes that it did not impose a discovery deadline in this case. The Defendant 
has pointed out, and this Court was given to understand, that both parties represented to the Court 
that discovery was complete in this case during a telephone scheduling conference on February 3, 
2006. Based on that understanding the Court set August 1, 2006 as the deadline by which both 
parties must file all dispositive motions, if any. 
Given this case history, the August 1,2006 deadline presupposes an end to the discovery 
process. By its order, the Court has directed that the attorneys can assume and evaluate the evidence 
which has been discovered in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and if they choose, 
make an assessment of the strength of a party's legal position. Such an assessment could not be 
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made as directed by the Court if the evidentiary landscape is ever-changing1. Therefore, Plaintiff 
may not "sit" on evidence whether intentional, or by oversight, while the Defendant complies with 
the Court's imposed deadline, and then supplement its (the Plaintiffs) evidence as needed to defeat 
the motion for summary judgment. Such procedure effectively nullifies the puipose and benefits 
offered by summary judgment motions. After careful consideration, and respectfully, the Court 
concludes that to receive Plaintiffs newly produced evidence under such circumstances would 
constitute reversible error on the part of this Court. 
The Plaintiff has been, for well over three years now, obligated to provide all information 
relevant to this case to the Defendant. The Plaintiff failed to do so at his own risk. The Plaintiff 
acknowledged that discovery had been completed prior to February 3, 2006. The Plaintiffs 
production of, allegedly, key evidence some three years and six months after filing this case, and 
over six months after the Plaintiff agreed that discovery was finished, is simply untimely. Therefore, 
as to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, this Court will only consider evidence 
exchanged by the parties, and properly presented to the Court prior to August 1, 2006, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56©) states that summary judgment "shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
'Rule 26(a)(4)(c) does call for the exchange of exhibits thirty days prior to trial. The 
practical implication of the rule is the closure of discovery at the exhibit exchange deadline. 
However, all the rule does is imply the end of discovery, just as a dispositive motion deadline 
implies the end of discovery. Both deadlines presuppose that the discovery period has ended. 
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is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National American Life 
Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated that summary 
judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect the prompt 
administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where no triable issue 
of fact is disclosed." Id. at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary judgment is to "provide 
a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can be resolved as a matter of 
law, thereby conserving both party and court resources. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68 
(Utah 1976). 
With the exception of evidence regarding the trenching and backfill studies, as conceded 
in Defendant's Reply, the Court finds that Plaintiff, Sunridge Development, has failed to martial 
admissible evidence as to its claim for damages. A simple statement that one has been damaged is 
not evidence; it is a legal conclusion. This Court cannot make that unsupported conclusion, and 
cannot refuse a motion for summary judgment where no material fact has effectively established the 
issue. For these reasons, and those argued by the Defendant, which the Court adopts and 
incorporates herein, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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The Court further directs counsel for Defendant to prepare an Order consistent with this 
ruling. 
Dated this /^V^day of September, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
p G E FRED D. HOW. 
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Attorneys for RB&G Engineering, Inc. 
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Facsimile: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RB&G ENGINEERING, INC., 
Defendant. 
STIPULATED MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 030400328 
Division No. 5 
Plaintiffs Sunridge Development Corp. and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, and defendant 
RB&G Engineering Inc., by and through their respective counsel of record hereby stipulate as set 
forth below and move the Court for a final, appealable order as follows: 
1. The Court granted partial summary judgment on September 1, 2005. This order is 
final and appealable; 
2. The Court granted partial summary judgment on October 10, 2006, dismissing all 
Plaintiffs remaining claims, except for Plaintiffs claim for the "RB&G 
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Reports/Tests (post - 1995)." This is a final order, and PlaintifFs have waived 
their right to appeal the October, 10, 2006 partial summary judgment; 
3. Plaintiffs remaining claim regarding URB&G Reports/Tests (post - 1995)" has 
been fully comprised and settled and should be dismissed on its merits with 
prejudice, each party to bear their respective attorneys fees and costs. 
4. All the issues, claims and causes of actions in this lawsuit have now been ruled 
upon or otherwise determined, and the parties stipulate to a final order by this 
court disposing of all issues in this case. 
DATED this [\^~ day ofWtDvember, 2006. 
/ 
HILL JOHNSON &S 
<fr, 
/ 
Stephen"" QiiesenlWry ^~* 
AttoMeys b^p^ Sunridge Development Corp. 
/and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC 
DATED this ( u day of November, 2006. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Craig 
Zachary E. Peterson 
Attorneys for RB&G Engineering Inc. 
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Sunridge Development Corporation; and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, v. RB&G Engineering, Inc., Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20070099-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2008 UTApp 29; 177 PM 644; 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 30; 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 25 
January 25, 2008, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] 
Fourth District, American Fork Department, 
070100134. The Honorable Fred D. Howard. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, developer 
and new company, challenged the judgment of the 
Fourth District, American Fork Department, Utah, grant-
ing summary judgment in favor of appellee engineering 
company, on claims of negligence and breach of con-
tract. 
OVERVIEW: The developer contracted with the engi-
neering company to perform a geologic study of 10.2 
acres, and to perform a geotechnical investigation of the 
property. Based on the two reports, the developer pro-
ceeded with its plan to develop eighty-six units on the 
property. The developer later formed the new company 
for liability purposes, and conveyed the property to the 
new company. Additional testing uncovered substantial 
faults not reflected in the engineering company's earlier 
reports, and the new company was forced to redesign its 
development plan around the newly uncovered faults. 
The reduction in units and the corresponding delays re-
sulted in a claimed loss of well over one million dollars. 
The trial court ruled in favor of the engineering company 
on two separate motions for summary judgment. The 
appellate court ruled that both the developer and the new 
company were precluded from claiming any damages 
against the engineering company, whether sounding in 
contract or torts, because the developer and new com-
pany agreed to not appeal a second summary judgment in 
favor of the engineering company. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed. 
CORE TERMS: summary judgment, assignee, assignor, 
contract claim, breach of contract, privity, faults, eco-
nomic loss, geological, admit, final judgment, deadline, 
litigate, dollar, dispositive, colleagues, question of law, 
sworn statement, legal conclusion, issues of material 
fact, abuse of discretion, contractual, genuine, obligor, 
entities, facie, sworn, shoes, development plan, claims of 
negligence 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Re-
view > Standards of Review 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > 
Appropriateness 
[HN1] Summary judgment is appropriate only when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). Whether a party is entitled to summary 
judgment presents a question of law, and the appellate 
court grants no deference to the trial court's legal conclu-
sions and reviews them for correctness. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Abuse of Discretion 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on 
Evidence 
[HN2] A trial court has broad discretion to admit or ex-
clude evidence and its determination typically will only 
be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Contracts Law > Performance > Assignment > General 
Overview 
Contracts Law > Third Parties > General Overview 
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[HN3] Under the law of assignments, assignees are enti-
tled to bring against the obligor any contractual action 
the assignor could have brought. An assignee gains noth-
ing more, and acquires no greater interest than had his 
assignor. The assignee is subject to any defenses that 
would have been good against the assignor; the assignee 
cannot recover more than the assignor could recover; and 
the assignee never stands in a better position than the 
assignor. It is well established that an assignor cannot 
assign rights he or she does not have. Conversely, an 
assignment does not have the effect of canceling any 
rights which other persons have in connection with a 
contract. However, without a claim for damages, the 
assignee has no breach of contract action. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Time 
Limitations 
[HN4] A party has thirty days to appeal a final judgment 
and order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
COUNSEL: Stephen Quesenberry and Charles L. Per-
schon, Provo, for Appellants. 
Craig C. Coburn, Zachary E. Peterson, Michael J. How-
ell, and Jennifer Mastrorocco, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lee. 
JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge. I CONCUR: Pamela 
T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge. BENCH, Judge (dis-
senting). 
OPINION BY: James Z. Davis 
OPINION 
[**644] DAVIS, Judge: 
[*P1] Sunridge Development Corporation (SDC) 
and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC (SEL) appeal from the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
RB&G Engineering, Inc. (RB&G) on claims of negli-
gence and breach of contact. However, [**645] Plain-
tiffs agreed to not appeal a second summary judgment in 
favor of RB&G, which concluded that SDC did not pre-
sent prima facie evidence of damages. We therefore af-
firm. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] In 1993, SDC contracted with RB&G to per-
form a geologic study of 10.2 acres that would become 
the Alpine Brook Development (the Property). The pur-
pose of the 1993 study was to analyze potential faults 
and other geologic features of the Property that could 
affect SDC's ability to develop the Property. In 1995, 
SDC contracted with RB&G to perform a geotechnical 
investigation of the Property, whereby RB&G [***2] 
was to determine whether geological hazards existed on 
the Property and recommend foundation designs for 
SDC's development plan. In the 1995 report, RB&G 
concluded that the small faults on the Property were ex-
pected for the area and did not present problems for de-
velopment. Based on these two RB&G reports, SDC 
proceeded with its plan to develop eighty-six units on the 
Property. 
[*P31 In 1996, SDC principal Stephen Stewart 
formed SEL for liability purposes, and SDC conveyed 
the Property to SEL. The conveyance included the as-
signment to SEL of all of SDC's rights and claims in 
relation to the various engineering reports, surveys, stud-
ies, and zoning approvals. ' In 1998, when the first stage 
of development was nearly complete, the Utah Geologi-
cal Association recommended further testing of the 
Property, which RB&G performed. This additional test-
ing uncovered substantial faults not reflected in RB&G's 
earlier reports, and SEL was forced to redesign its devel-
opment plan around the newly uncovered faults. Because 
SEL could no longer safely develop the lots located over 
the faults and because the road location could not be 
moved, the number of units to be developed was reduced 
by fourteen. The [***3] reduction in units and the corre-
sponding delays resulted in a claimed loss of well over 
one million dollars. 
1 For purposes of summary judgment, the par-
ties centered their arguments on the effect of the 
assignment and not on the underlying validity 
thereof. At trial, however, SEL would have the 
burden of proving the validity of the assignment 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
[*P4] SDC and SEL both filed suit against RB&G, 
alleging negligence and breach of contract. In August 
and September of 2005, the trial court ruled in favor of 
RB&G on two separate motions for summary judgment. 
The first motion was primarily against SEL, arguing al-
ternative rationales for prohibiting SEL from claiming 
damages against RB&G: the economic loss rule, see 
generally SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, PP 32-35, 28 
P. 3d 669, and a lack of privity between SEL and RB&G. 
The second motion for summary judgment was against 
SDC and alleged that SDC had failed to establish a prima 
facie case for the claim that RB&G breached its contract 
with SDC. Specifically, RB&G claimed SDC failed to 
produce evidence of damages.2 
2 We do not address Plaintiffs' arguments relat-
ing to [***4] the trial court's application of the 
economic loss rule and its rejection of the adop-
tion of the independent duty concept for engi-
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neers because our decision—based on RB&G's 
motion for summary judgment against SDC—is 
dispositive. 
[*P5] The only evidence SDC presented in re-
sponse to the second motion for summary judgement 
came in the form of sworn affidavits. The trial court de-
nied the admission of SDC's affidavits because they were 
offered after the August 1, 2006 deadline for parties to 
file dispositive motions. "Given this case history," the 
trial court wrote, "the August 1, 2006 deadline presup-
poses an end of the discovery process." In granting the 
motion, the trial court specifically found: "[SDC] has 
failed to marshal admissible evidence as to its claim for 
damages. A simple statement that one has been damaged 
is not evidence; it is a legal conclusion." 
[*P6] On December 18, 2006, the parties then 
stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of SDC's 
claims against RB&G for breach of contract; Plaintiffs 
also agreed not to appeal the trial court's second sum-
mary judgment ruling. On January 5, 2007, the trial court 
entered the final judgment and order thereon. Plaintiffs 
now challenge the trial [***5] court's [**646] grant of 
RB&G's first motion for summary judgment. 
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*P7] Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on SEL's breach of contract and neg-
ligence claims in favor of RB&G. 3 [HN1] Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment pre-
sents a question of law, and we grant no deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions and review them for cor-
rectness. See Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, P 
10, 164 P.3d 353] Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 235 (Utah 1993). Yet, "[a] [HN2] trial court has 
broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its 
determination typically will only be disturbed if it consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 
96, P 20, 989 P.2d 52; see also State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 
UT 32, P 8, 76 P. 3d 1165 ("Although the admission or 
exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we review a 
trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evi-
dence for an abuse of discretion."). 
3 Per stipulation, Plaintiffs do not challenge the 
[***6] trial court's grant of summary judgment on 
SDC's breach of contract claim, nor the refusal of 
the trial court to admit the affidavits into evi-
dence. We therefore do not address these issues. 
See State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (declining to consider is-
sues not raised on appeal when a party the had 
opportunity to do so). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P8] SEL argues that it should be allowed to pur-
sue its breach of contract claim against RB&G beyond 
the summary judgment stage because the assignment of 
the contracts in question allows SEL, as the assignee, to 
assert the claims against RB&G that SDC would have 
been able to assert had the assignment never taken place. 
[HN3] Under the law of assignments, "[assignees] are 
entitled to bring against the [obligor] any contractual 
action the [assignor] could have brought." Spears v. 
Warr, 2002 UT 24, P 40, 44 P.3d 742. "[A]n assignee 
gains nothing more, and acquires no greater interest than 
had his assignor . . . ." Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 612 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980) (citing Che-
ney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963); 
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, 885, affd 
in part and set aside in part, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 
791 (1957)); [***7] see also SME Indus., Inc., 2001 UT 
54, P 16, 28 P.3d 669 ("The assignee is subject to any 
defenses that would have been good against the [as-
signor]; the assignee cannot recover more than the as-
signor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a 
better position than the assignor."* (alteration in original) 
(quoting 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 144 (1999))); West 
v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, n.l, 139 P. 3d 
1059 ("It is well established that an assignor cannot as-
sign rights he or she does not have."). Conversely, "an 
assignment does not have the effect of canceling any 
rights which other persons have in connection with [a 
contract]." Tanner, 305 P.2d at 885. However, "without 
a claim for damages, the [assignee] ha[s] no breach of 
contract action." West, 139 P. 3d 1059, 2006 UT App 222, 
n.l (citing Bait v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, P 
14,20P.3d388). 
[*P9] Here, at the time of assignment, RB&G had 
already completed its geological surveys under its con-
tracts with SDC. In response to the second motion for 
summary judgment, SDC attempted to submit affidavits 
into evidence regarding damages. But the trial court re-
fused to admit the affidavits, ruling that they were not 
timely, and this ruling [***8] was included in the second 
summary judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiffs stipulated not 
to appeal this second summary judgment ruling. The 
parties entered into this stipulation on December 18, 
2006, and the trial court entered the final judgment and 
order on January 5, 2007. [HN4] Plaintiffs had thirty 
days to appeal the final judgment and order. See Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a). However, per the stipulation, they did not 
do so. Since assignment merely allows the assignee to 
stand in the shoes of the assignor, SEL is precluded from 
claiming damages against RB&G-an essential element 
of any claim, see Campbell, [**647] Maack & Sessions 
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v. Debiy, 2001 UT App 397, P 21, 38 P.3d P^-because 
SEL stipulated that SDC failed to prove damages against 
RB&G. SEL is similarly precluded from claiming the 
affidavits were improperly excluded.4 
4 While it is true that "it only takes one sworn 
statement under oath to dispute the averments on 
the other side of the controversy and create an is-
sue of fact," thereby precluding summary judg-
ment, Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1975), if such evidence is untimely it may 
still properly be excluded, even if the result leads 
to a grant of summary judgment against the 
[***9] party seeking its introduction. Cf. Gerbich 
v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, P 17, 977 P.2d 1205 
(M[W]e conclude that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it prevented the inspector 
from testifying as an expert based on the lateness 
of the designation and the fact that Numed's 
counsel did not have an opportunity to either pre-
pare a cross-examination or call rebuttal wit-
nesses."). 
[*P10] Plaintiffs argue that at the time of assign-
ment, damages were not yet ripe because the errors in 
RB&G's geological surveys were not discovered until 
years later. Nevertheless, even after the errors were dis-
covered, SEL never pursued a damages claim against 
SDC for conveying SEL a property allegedly worth over 
a million dollars less than SEL paid. SEL cannot be 
"permitted to enjoy the benefits of [its] separate corpo-
rate structure for some purposes while also claiming [that 
the trial court] elevate[d] form over substance in an at-
tempt to [attach SEL's damages against SDC to RB&G]." 
Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169, P 51, 163 P.3d 662 
(citing Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 
888, 891 (Utah 1975)), cert, granted, 168 P.3d 1264 
(Utah 2007). 
CONCLUSION 
[*P11] SDC's assignment to SEL of all rights 
[***10] and claims relating to the contracts for the sur-
vey work of RB&G put SEL in the same position as 
SDC-without admissible evidence of damages against 
RB&G. Because Plaintiffs agreed not to appeal the trial 
court's granting of the second motion for summary 
judgment, both SDC and SEL are precluded from claim-
ing any damages against RB&G, whethersounding in 
contract or torts. We therefore affirm the decision of the 
trial court. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
[*P12] I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
DISSENT BY: Russell W. Bench 
DISSENT 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
[*P13] Procedurally, SEL's claims were dismissed 
entirely in September 2005 when the trial court ruled that 
there was a lack of privity and applied the economic loss 
rule, thereby foreclosing SEL's breach of contract and 
negligence claims respectively. In October 2006, the trial 
court dismissed SDC's breach of contract claim for fail-
ing to timely produce evidence of damages. Finally, in 
December 2006, a stipulation was entered into by which 
SDC, as the only remaining "Plaintiff," agreed to settle 
the lone outstanding claim against RB&G and waive its 
right to appeal the October 2006 summary judgment or-
der. The issues before us on appeal are focused on the 
summary judgment [***11] entered against SEL in Sep-
tember of 2005. 
[*P14] The majority fails to analyze the central is-
sue presented: whether SEL was in privity with RB&G 
for purposes of asserting a breach of contract claim. The 
trial court dismissed SEL's case at the summary judg-
ment stage for a lack of privity. Yet, my colleagues do 
not even attempt to address whether this determination 
was in error. Instead, they skip ahead and use the trial 
court's later dismissal of SDC's breach of contract claim, 
on procedural grounds, as retroactive justification for 
thwarting SEL's appeal. 
[*P15] Privity is a paramount consideration in this 
case. If the trial court was wrong about SEL's privity 
with RB&G, which I believe it was, then SDC's claim 
should have never gone forward as it did. SEL, as the 
assignee, is the proper party to litigate the breach of con-
tract claim. The effect of the majority's opinion is to re-
quire an assignee like SEL to rely upon its assignor to 
litigate the issue of damages against the obligor. This 
line of reasoning is contrary to the rule that assignees 
stand in the shoes of their assignors. See 6 Am. Jur. 2d 
Assignments § 144 [**648] (1999). Although an as-
signee's damages are limited to those damages the as-
signor [***12] would have suffered, the assignee should 
not be required to depend upon the assignor to litigate on 
its behalf. The majority pays lip service to the notion that 
SEL and SDC should be treated as separate and distinct 
entities and then effectively treats them as one, binding 
SEL to the result of SDC's failed litigation, ostensibly 
because the two corporate entities are run by the same 
person. 
[*P16] In affirming, the majority also ignores evi-
dence in the record that should have moved SEL's claim 
past summary judgment. In April 2005, more than a year 
before the trial court's deadline for submitting evidence 
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of damages, SDC principal Stephen Stewart filed a 
sworn affidavit with the trial court. The affidavit out-
lined, in specific dollar amounts, SDC's damages result-
ing from the failure of RB&G to detect the pertinent 
faults on the Property. This "one sworn statement" is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Hol-
brook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). The 
record shows that the trial court's vague parenthetical 
reference to the affidavit as a "generalized summary," 
stated in the order dismissing SDC's claim for failure to 
prove damages, amounts to an impermissible considera-
tion [***13] of the weight or credibility of evidence at 
the summary judgment stage. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576 
P.2dl291, 1292 (Utah 1978). 
[*P17] Finally, the majority has not addressed 
SEL's alternative argument on appeal, namely that the 
economic loss rule should not bar its claim of negli-
gence. Without explanation, my colleagues conclude that 
their decision is dispositive and they need not consider 
SEL's alternative arguments on appeal. But because they 
hold that SEL has no contractual claim to pursue, my 
colleagues must deal with SEL's alternative argument for 
negligence. 
[*P18] For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. In my view, SEL should be allowed to pursue its 
breach of contract claim against RB&G and prove dam-
ages in accordance with the law of assignments. I would 
therefore reverse the summary judgment and remand for 
further proceedings on SEL's claim for breach of con-
tract. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc. et al. 
X06CV000169755S 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
WATERBURY, COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET AT WATERBURY 
2003 Conn, Super. LEXIS 3338 
December 3, 2003, Decided 
December 3, 2003, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] THIS DECISION IS UNRE-
PORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER 
APPELLATE REVIEW COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED 
TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION 
OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE 
JUDGES: Jon M Alander, Judge of the Superior Court 
OPINION BY: Jon M Alander 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages 
for the loss of use of its building damaged by fire as a 
result of the alleged negligence of the defendant Design 
Learned, Inc ("Design Learned"), an engineering firm 
The plaintiff claims that, during construction of the 
building, Design Learned negligently failed to specify 
non-combustible flooring or a heat shield near burner 
units, resulting in a fire While the plaintiff had a con-
tiact with the construction manager of the project, it 
lacked a contract with Design Learned Design Learned 
has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that 
the plaintiffs claim is barred by the economic loss doc-
time 
The appellate courts of this state have not lecog-
nized the economic loss rule advocated by Design 
Learned, that, in the absence of privity of contract or m 
the absence of injury to person or property, the plaintiff 
may not recover m tort for economic losses The decision 
[*2] in Flagg Energy Development Corp v General 
Motors Corp, 244 Conn 126, 155, 709 A 2d 1075 
(1998), is inapposite as it addresses the remedies avail-
able under the Umform Commercial Code for injuries 
resulting from the sale of an allegedly defective product 
In the context of this case, given the allegations of 
the complaint, the applicable law remams that a tortfea-
sor is liable for negligently causing harm that was fore-
seeable Coburn v Lenox Homes Inc, 186 Conn 370, 
441 A 2d 620 (1982) Design Learned's knowledge that 
the plaintiff would rely on its work eliminates any con-
cern that the lack of an economic loss rule of the sort 
propounded by the defendant may result in unlimited 
liability See Ciaigv Everett M Biooks Co , 351 Mass 
497, 222 NE2d 752, 755 (1967) 
In short, I find persuasive the well reasoned opinions 
m RCD-Hudson v TAT Mason Enterprises Superior 
Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No CV 00 
598478 S, (Jan 17, 2001) (Beach, J ) (29 Conn L Rprr 
261), and Insurance Company ofNoith America v Town 
of Manchester, 17 F Supp 2d 81 (D Conn 1998), re-
jecting the application of a blanket [*3] prohibition on 
the recovery of economic losses resulting from negligent 
conduct in the absence of privity of contract Accoid-
mgly, Design Learned's motion for summary judgment is 
hereby denied 
BY THE COURT 
Jon M Alander 
Judge of the Supenor Court 
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Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Engineers 
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17 Mass. L. Rep. 25; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 400 
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DISPOSITION: Summary judgment granted in part 
and denied in part. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant engineering 
company supplied engineering services to a town, and 
reviewed plaintiff developer's application for subdivision 
approval. The developer alleged claims of negligence, 
breach of contract, breach of implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and vio-
lation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 A, contending the com-
pany performed the engineering services negligently. 
The company moved for summary judgment. 
OVERVIEW: Pursuant to precedent, summary judg-
ment had to be denied on the negligence claim. The 
company knew the identity of the developer, and knew 
that the developer would be relying on its work. How-
ever, there was an absence of evidence from which a 
fair-minded jury could conclude that the developer had a 
contract with the company. The company's only contract 
in the case was with the town. Thus, the company was 
entitled to summary judgment on the contract claim. 
Also, because there was no contract with the developer 
and no supplying of goods by the company to the devel-
oper, there was no implied warranty of merchantability 
or fitness for a particular purpose, and the company was 
entitled to summary judgment on these implied warranty 
claims. Finally, the company was entitled to summary 
judgment on the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A because it was 
not engaged in trade or commerce with the developer 
when it reviewed the plans for the planning board in ful-
fillment of the planning board's statutory duties, and be-
cause there was an absence of evidence in the summary 
judgment materials that the company engaged in any 
unfair or deceptive conduct. 
OUTCOME: The company's motion for summary 
judgment was denied as to the negligence claim, and 
granted in all other respects. 
CORE TERMS: engineering, summary judgment, pub-
lic employee, engineer, negligence claim, economic 
losses, particular purpose, immunity, fitness, warranties 
of merchantability, public employer, contractor, part-
time, case law, warranty claim, right to exercise, inde-
pendent contractor, absence of evidence, statutory duties, 
full-time, supplied, drainage, supplier, commerce, re-
quired to pay, negligently, retention, assigned, pond 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Governments > Local Governments > Employees & 
Officials 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relation-
ships > At-Will Employment > Employees 
[HN1] The "public employee" definition in Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 258, § /, includes part-time as well as full-time 
officers and employees. 
Governments > Local Governments > Employees & 
Officials 
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Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relation-
ships > At-Will Employment > Employees 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relation-
ships > At-Will Employment > Employers 
[HN2] The "public employee" definition in Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 258, § / , must also be read in conjunction with 
the "public employer" definition in the same section. To 
be a public employee the person must be an officer or 
employee "of any public employer." The "public em-
ployer" definition includes towns and other government 
entities if the employer "exercises direction and control" 
over the public employee. Consistently with these inter-
locking definitions, the case law has relied on the princi-
pal's right to exercise direction and control as a primary 
consideration in determining whether a particular defen-
dant is a public employee for Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258 
immunity purposes. 
JUDGES: [*1] Charles J. Hely, Justice. 
OPINION BY: Charles J. Hely 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT 
A. Introduction 
The defendant Atlantic Design Engineers supplied 
engineering services to the Town of Middleborough and 
served part-time as the town engineer. Atlantic was as-
signed by the Middlebourough Planning Board to review 
the plaintiff Nestlenook's application for approval of a 
subdivision proposed by Nestlenook. Nestlenook claims 
that Atlantic performed the engineering services negli-
gently. Specifically, Nestlenook claims that Atlantic's 
comment letter to the town negligently required Nestle-
nook to design and construct a retention pond as part of 
the drainage system for the subdivision. Nestlenook con-
tends that its construction of the retention pond in com-
pliance with Atlantic's comment letter caused it eco-
nomic losses and property damage. 
Nestlenook alleges claims for negligence, breach of 
contract, breach of implied warranties of merchantability 
and fitness for a particular purpose, and violation of 
G.L.c. 93A, Only the negligence claim can survive 
summary judgment. 
B. Public Employee Immunity 
Atlantic is not entitled to summary [*2] judgment 
under the public employee immunity in G.L.c. 258, § 2. 
[HN1] The "public employee" definition in G.L.c. 
258, § 1, includes part-time as well as full-time officers 
and employees. Atlantic's part-time status with the town 
does not preclude public employee immunity. 
[HN2] The "public employee" definition in Section 
1, must also be read in conjunction with the "public em-
ployer" definition in the same section. To be a public 
employee the person must be an officer or employee "of 
any public employer." The "public employer" definition 
includes towns and other government entities if the em-
ployer "exercises direction and control" over the public 
employee. Consistently with these interlocking defini-
tions, the case law has relied on the principal's right to 
exercise direction and control as a primary consideration 
in determining whether a particular defendant is a public 
employee for Chapter 258 immunity purposes. Kelley v. 
Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 661-64, 481 N.EJd 1340 
(1985)\Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666, 669, 481 
NE.2d 1344 (1985). 
Although Atlantic may have held the title of town 
engineer as a single, [*3] full-time employee might in 
other towns, the evidence is that Atlantic was an inde-
pendent contractor. The evidence supports Nestlenook's 
argument that Atlantic was not subject to the right of 
direction and control by the town in how it performed its 
engineering services. Atlantic no doubt was subject to 
some control by the town in that the town assigned it 
projects and identified the scope of each particular as-
signment. The manner of carrying out these assignments 
was still a matter of Atlantic's independent professional 
engineering judgment. The town was not Atlantic's only 
engineering client, and this is also a relevant factor. At-
lantic is a private corporation, and it acts through a group 
of human agents rather than one person. These factors 
also lessen the town's right to exercise direction and con-
trol over how Atlantic performed its professional ser-
vices. 
Suffice it to say that Atlantic has not demonstrated 
that it was not an independent contractor, and it has not 
shown that the town retained the right to control the 
manner of Atlantic's performance of its professional ser-
vices. See Kelley v. Rossi, supra; Smith v. Steinberg, 
supra; Williams v. Hartman, 413 Mass. 398, 400-01, 597 
N.E.2d 1024 (1997); [*4] Hopper v. Callahan, 408 
Mass. 621, 634, 562 N.E.2d 822 (1990); Thornton v. 
Commonwealth, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 511, 514, 552 NE.2d 
601 (1990); compare McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 
Mass. 43, 48, 546 N.E.2d 139 (1989); Williams v. 
Bresnahan, 27 Mass.App.Ct. J91, 536 NE.2d 365 
(1989); Florio v. Kennedy, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 917, 464 
NE.2d 1373 (1984). 
C. Economic Loss Rule 
Atlantic is not entitled to summary judgment under the 
economic loss rule. Nestlenook has presented evidence 
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that it sustained physical damage to its property, rather 
than just economic loss, allegedly caused by negligence 
of Atlantic. Priority Finishing Corp. v. LAL Construction 
Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct 719, 721, 667 N.E.2d 290 
(1996). 
D. Negligence and Duty 
Atlantic argues that it performed engineering services 
only to the town Planning Board and that it cannot be 
liable in negligence to Nestlenook because it owed no 
legal duty to Nestlenook. Atlantic relies on the lender's 
attorney malpractice case of Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 
55,445N.E.2dl48(1982). 
As Nestlenook correctly points out, [*5] however, 
the negligence claim against Atlantic in this case is much 
more analogous to the negligence claim against the engi-
neer in Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351 Mass. 497, 
500-01, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967). In Craig, the court re-
versed the directed verdict for the defendant engineer on 
a negligence claim despite the lack of a contractual rela-
tionship between the plaintiff contractor and the engi-
neer. The defendant engineer in Craig knew the identity 
of the plaintiff contractor and knew that the contractor 
would be relying on the locations of the stakes that the 
defendant engineer put in for the landowner. Id. Under 
the authority of Craig, summary judgment must be de-
nied on the negligence claim. 
E. Contract 
There is an absence of evidence from which a fair-
minded jury could conclude that Nestlenook had a con-
tract with Atlantic. Atlantic was selected by the town to 
perform engineering services for the town. It is true that 
Nestlenook reimbursed the town for Atlantic's engineer-
ing services. If Nestlenook wanted to proceed with the 
subdivision application, it had no choice. Nestlenook was 
required to pay this reimbursement to the town by the 
[*6] Planning Board's procedures. 
Nestlenook did not pay Atlantic for services pro-
vided to Nestlenook. Nestlenook instead was required to 
pay to the town the town's costs for having Atlantic per-
form engineering services for the town. The services 
Atlantic provided for the town were to determine for the 
town whether Nestlenook's plans satisfied the town's 
subdivision regulations and to make comments on what 
type of modifications would be required for compliance. 
Atlantic was hired to protect the town, not Nestlenook. 
Atlantic's only contract in this case was with the town. 
Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment on the contract 
claim. 
F. Implied Warranties of Merchantability and Fit-
ness for a Particular Purpose 
If the defendant had been a supplier of a product or 
other "goods" to the plaintiff, there would be an implied 
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose, provided that the plaintiff was a person whom 
the defendant might reasonably have expected to use the 
goods. G.L.c. 106, §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-318. Lack of priv-
ity between the user of the goods and the supplier would 
[*7J not be a defense to a breach of warranty claim in 
such circumstances. G.L.c. 106, §2-318. 
In this case Atlantic supplied no "goods" to Nestle-
nook. G.L.c. 106, § 2-105 (definition of "goods"); Garcia 
v. Kusan, Inc., 39 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 327, 655 N.E.2d 
1290 (1995) ("Even assuming in the plaintiffs favor that 
the [floor hockey] game-the concept and instructions-
was the "product" which was sold . . ., there is no legal 
support for imposing liability on such a "product" where 
the seller does not provide a tangible item as well as in-
structions"). Because there was no contract with Nestle-
nook and no supplying of goods by Atlantic to Nestle-
nook, there was no implied warranty of merchantability 
or fitness for a particular purpose. Atlantic is entitled to 
summary judgment on these implied warranty claims. 
G. Chapter 93A and Trade or Commerce 
On the Chapter 93A claim, Atlantic is entitled to 
summary judgment for two reasons. The summary judg-
ment evidence demonstrates that Atlantic's connection 
with Nestlenook in this case was strictly in the context of 
Atlantic providing engineering services to the town. [*8] 
Nestlenook alleges that it relied on Atlantic's recom-
mended changes to the drainage plans, but that reliance 
was only in the context of Nestlenook's application to the 
town Planning Board for subdivision approval. Atlantic's 
dealings with Nestlenook were solely as an agent for the 
town Planning Board in the course of the Planning Board 
performing its statutory duties under the Subdivision 
Control Law, G.L.c. 41, §§ 81K-81GG. 
Atlantic's performance of engineering services for 
the town Planning Board involved no business context 
relationship between Atlantic and Nestlenook. Under the 
Chapter 93A case law involving governmental defen-
dants, Atlantic was therefore not engaged in trade or 
commerce with Nestlenook when it reviewed Nestle-
nook's plans for the Planning Board in fulfillment of the 
Planning Board's statutory duties. Boston Housing Au-
thority v. Howard, 427 Mass. 537, 695 N.E.2d 192 
(1998); Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority, 427 Mass. 509, 534, 694 N.E.2d 820 
(1998); PeabodyN.E., Inc. v. Marshfield, 426 Mass. 436, 
439-40, 689 N.E.2d 774 (1998); Poznik v. Medical Pro-
fessional Insurance Association, 417 Mass. 48, 52, 628 
N.E.2d 1 (1994); [*9] All Seasons Sendees, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Health and Hospitals of Boston, 416 
Mass. 269, 271, 620 N.E.2d 778 (1993); Morton v. 
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Hanover, 43 MassApp.Ct 197, 206, 682 N.E.2d 889 
(1997); Bretton v. State Lottery Commission, 41 
MassApp.Ct 736, 673 N.E.2d 76 (1996). 
The second reason why Atlantic has no Chapter 93A 
liability is that there is an absence of evidence in the 
summary judgment materials that Atlantic engaged in 
any unfair or deceptive conduct, even assuming that 
there was negligence by Atlantic in reviewing and com-
menting on Nestlenook's plans. 
H. Order 
Summary judgment will enter for the defendant 
dismissing all claims in the plaintiffs complaint except 
Count I alleging negligence. 
October 22, 2003 
Charles J. Hely 
Justice 
